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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Senators pointed out, art lost in the Holocaust is not
just important for its aesthetic and cultural value. Restitution
is so much more, much more than that, than reclaiming a
material good, and this is what I learned by playing Maria
Altmann. Restoring physical parts of lost heritage to
Holocaust victims and their families is a moral imperative….
Art restitution is about preserving the fundamental human
condition. It gives Jewish people and other victims of the
Nazi terror the opportunity to reclaim their history, their
culture, their memories, and most importantly, their
families…. Art is a reflection of memories and is shared
across familial and cultural lines. When the Jewish people
were dispossessed of their art, they lost their heritage.
Memories were taken along with the art. And to have no
memories is like having no family. And that is why art
restitution is so imperative.
Testimony from Dame Helen Mirren to the Senate Judiciary
Committee on June 7, 2016. 1
Jennifer Anglim Kreder is a Professor of Law at the NKU-Chase College of
Law. She has been involved in Holocaust-era and art litigation since 1999 and
formerly worked at Milbank Tweed in New York City. For more information,
see JenniferKreder.com.
** Virginia Leigh Schell, J.D., NKU-Chase College of Law.
1 The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act—Reuniting Victims with Their
Lost Heritage: Hearing on S. 2763, The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery
Act Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution and
Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts,
114th Cong. 1 (2016) (testimony by Dame Helen Mirren).
*
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In the 2015 film Woman in Gold, Dame Helen Mirren
portrayed Maria Altmann, a Holocaust survivor who engaged in
extensive efforts to recover a stolen portrait of her aunt by the artist
Gustav Klimt, Adele Bloch-Bauer I (commonly known as Woman
in Gold), from the Austrian government. 2 The painting was stolen
by the Nazis after Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, Adele’s widower, fled
Austria following the German Anschluss. The United States
Supreme Court accepted the Austrian government’s 2004 petition
for certiorari on the issue of whether a foreign government could be
sued in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.3 The Supreme Court determined that the provisions of the
FSIA were indeed retroactive to 1945 and applied to Ms. Altmann’s
case.4 The Court’s ruling lead to arbitration between Ms. Altmann
and Austria, which resulted in an order for the return of the painting
to Ms. Altmann.5
Maria Altmann’s initial struggle is the story of many
Holocaust survivors who have faced museums and private collectors
intent on keeping art they should have at least suspected was stolen
by the Nazis. But, unlike many survivors and their descendants, Ms.
Altmann, aided by a great attorney, had the ability to locate the
stolen painting and to pursue legal action against the government of
Austria for its return. Unfortunately, Ms. Altmann’s victory in the
United States Supreme Court and the arbitration with Austria that
followed is the outlier in the adjudications of Holocaust
expropriated art.
For most Holocaust survivors and their
descendants, their stories are those of defeat with no opportunity to
have their day in court, mostly due to application of procedural rules
severely restricting their ability to file suit or have their cases heard
on the merits.
Woman in Gold (2015) https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2404425/
See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
4 Id.
5 Ms. Altmann offered the Republic of Austria the opportunity to purchase the
painting so it could stay in Austria, but Austria declined her offer replying that it
could not afford the painting. See Art of the Heist: The Lady in Gold (2008)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ifi3FMtF8uQ.
2
3
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Relying on extensive research of Ms. Altmann6 studied in
preparation for the movie, Dame Mirren appeared before Congress
to support the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act (“HEAR
Act”) on June 7, 2016, while the legislation was under consideration
by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, its Subcommittee on the
Constitution, and its Subcommittee on Oversight, Agency Action,
Federal Rights and Federal Courts.7 Dame Mirren testified before
the committees regarding the difficulties faced by Holocaust
survivors and their descendants in their efforts to retrieve their stolen
property.8 Despite the passage of nearly three quarters of a century,
Holocaust survivors and their descendants are still attempting to
piece together their cultural and familial history that was
systematically plundered and destroyed by the Nazis, and others,
during World War II and the decades thereafter.9 As Dame Mirren
noted, restitution of stolen art and other cultural property to the
victims of the Third Reich is not just about correcting a theft of
something financially valuable.10 Restitution is about the restoration
of culture to Jewish and other communities, their families, and, most
importantly, honoring their memories, all of which the Third Reich
attempted to obliterate.11

6Maria

Altmann died on February 7, 2011, at the age of 95.
http://www.legacy.com/ns/maria-altmann-obituary/148464498.
7 Senate committee report to S. 2763 at pg. 6
8 See https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/s-2763-the-holocaustexpropriated-art-recovery-act_reuniting-victims-with-their-lost-heritage
9 Id.
10 Id. Ms. Altmann explained that her dispute with Austria was not about the
money, but rather justice. She said, “They are getting away with a lie, saying
‘It’s ours, not yours.’” See
https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/music/howard-reich/ct-womangold-reflections-20150404-column.html. See also U.S. v. Portrait of Wally, 663
F.Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Austrian government required Holocaust
victims to make “donations” of art to Austria’s national collection before
issuing export permits for the restitution of Nazi-looted art.).
11 Id.
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Approximately six months after hearing testimony from
Dame Mirren and the experts involved in the field of Holocaust
expropriated art, Congress enacted with unanimous bipartisan
support the HEAR Act to address problems faced by Holocaust
survivors and their heirs in recovering artwork looted during the
Holocaust-era. This article addresses recent literature maintaining
that the HEAR Act is unconstitutional because its statute of
limitations provision purportedly interferes with principles of
federalism. Part One provides an overview of the relevant history
from the Nazis’ rise to power through the end of World War II that
serves as the backdrop for the provisions set forth in the HEAR Act
and key cases demonstrating the problems the HEAR Act addresses.
Part Two discusses the HEAR Act itself. Part Three reviews the
constitutional authority granted to Congress and the Executive
Branch in the areas of federal preemption and foreign policy. Part
Four demonstrates the constitutionality of the HEAR Act. Part Five
briefly concludes that the HEAR Act is constitutional and does not
interfere with principles of federalism.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE
PRECEDING THE HEAR ACT
A. The Nazis Rise to Power and World War II- 1933 to 1945
The Nazis rose to power in a climate rife with severe
economic depression and anti-Semitism as Europe tried to stabilize
following World War I. The Nazis blamed European Jews for
Germany’s failures and misfortunes during World I and thereafter.12
Once Hitler was appointed Chancellor in 1933, the Nazis and their
extreme nationalistic government were unstoppable.13 Their goal of
Marsha L. Rozenblit, Review of Steven E. Aschheim, Brothers and Sisters:
The East European Jew in German and German-Jewish Consciousness, 6
Modern Judaism 311 (1986).
13 See Wilfred F. Knapp, Adolf Hitler: Dictator 1933-39, Encyclopedia
Britannica, https://www.britannica/biography/Adolf-Hitler/Dictator-1933-39
[https://perma.cc/XUY2-CR6Y] (stating that Hitler quickly became a dictator
once in power).
12
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Aryanization of the Germanic culture would ultimately manifest in
the “Final Solution,” Nazi code for the worldwide destruction of the
Jewish people and their culture. 14 This plan included pillaging the
Jews and confiscating all their wealth and assets with the goal of
either destroying it entirely or profiting from it. To execute this plan,
the Nazis operated as a criminal network under the guise of the
law.15 They “legally” confiscated Jewish assets pursuant to their
laws.16 Due to the economic depression in Germany, the Nazis
needed Jewish wealth to fund their occupation of Europe and the
Final Solution.17 The Nazis also engaged in the deliberate and
systematic destruction of the Jewish people and their culture to
further their goals of European Aryanization.18
In 1935, the Nazis began passing the Nuremberg Laws to
target Jews and other minorities whom they deemed unfit for Aryan
culture.19 One of the Nuremberg Laws passed in 1938 required Jews
who possessed more than 5000 Reichsmarks of property to
periodically declare and inventory their assets with the Nazi
Property Control Office, and they were prohibited from selling their
property without permission from the government. 20 Any Jews who
wanted to emigrate from Germany had to pay an enormous exit tax,
colloquially known as the “flight tax,” to the German government
that effectively stripped these Jews of most of their wealth.21 To
make their thefts appear as legal and ordinary government action,
See https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/world/europe/27iht-berlin27.html.
Id.
16 Id.
17 It is estimated that approximately one-third of the money for the Nazi war
effort came from stolen Jewish property. Id.
18 Id.
19 See
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2010/winter/nuremberg.html
20 Gotz Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare
State 42 (Jefferson Chase trans., Metro Books 2005); Harold James, The
Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War Against the Jews 51 (2001).
21 See https://www.jta.org/1937/05/18/archive/nazis-exacted-70000000-flighttax-in-4-years.
14
15
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the Nazi government obsessively documented these transactions. 22
The property stolen from the Jews included art by some of the
world’s most esteemed artists, Old Masters like Rembrandt and
disdained Post-Impressionists such as van Gogh, Matisse, and more
modern (then) lesser-known artists such as Gustav Klimt and his
student Egon Schiele.23
The Nazis were obsessed with expelling modern art, coined
“degenerate art” by Hitler, from the continent.24 In his youth, Hitler
was a failed artist who believed he had great artistic talent. 25 But,
he was rejected by those in the popular avant-garde art community
of the time (many of whom were leftist-leaning)26 because of his
preference for painting bland, unoriginal watercolors. Hitler found
modern art and its rejection of formal, traditional artistic styles in
favor of abstract expressionist styles offensive. He believed art
should be symmetrical, realistic, and natural, and described modern
art as “a great and fatal illness” because it did not fit into the mold
of what he thought great art should be.27 Many of the successful
artists of the time were also Jewish and/or Communist. Thus, Hitler
William L. Shirer, 20th Century Journey: The Nightmare Years, 1930-1940,
30 (1984).
23 As illustrated by the cases discussed infra, the artwork at issue in these claims
is fine art created by highly sought after artists, e.g. Vincent van Gogh, Gustav
Klimt, Henri Matisse, Pablo Picasso, et al. Some of these artists were wellknown preceding the war (e.g. Rembrandt and other “Old Masters”), but some
have only recently gained fame in the decades following the war (e.g. Egon
Schiele).
24 Jonathan Petropoulos, Art as Politics in the Third Reich 54-55 (1996).
25 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Vol. I Ch. I,
http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/mkv1ch01.html (describing
Hitler’s youthful interest in painting and architecture, and his belief that he was
destined to be a great artist)[http://perma.cc/MDE8-XXHB].
26 Ralph Croizier, The Avant-Garde and the Democracy Movement: Reflections
on Late Communism in the USSR and China, 51 Europe-Asia Studies 3, 483,
485 (1999).
27 Godfrey Baker, The unfinished art business of World War Two, BBC News
(Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24812078 (citing
Hitler’s opening speech to the Haus der Kunst “degenerate art” exhibition)
[http://perma.cc/XUS6-PRJG].
22
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resented them, and the art world’s praises of their work that he
deemed to be “degenerate” art.
Masters of propaganda, the Nazis understood the power of
both classical and degenerate art as visual tools to further the Nazi
agenda in the eyes of the public. 28 Per Nazi decree, all modern art
was declared to be anti-German and required to be turned over to
the state.29 Yet, Nazi leaders, such as Joseph Goebbels, were
allowed to maintain their private collections of modern art. 30
Realizing that many of the leftist-leaning modern artists were using
artistic expression as a form of political opposition to the Nazis,
these works were confiscated and exhibited to the public in the die
Haustellum Entartete Kunst, the Exhibition of Degenerate Art, held
in late 1937.31 The Nazis concurrently held an exhibition of Naziapproved art to serve as a counter-balance to the exhibition of
degenerate art.32 The purpose of the six-month exhibition was to
Marc Balcells, Plundering Boys: A Cultural Criminology Assessment of the
Power of Cultural Heritage as a Cause for Plunder in Armed Conflicts Along
History, in Cultural Heritage in the Crosshairs: Protecting Cultural Property
During Conflict 329, 347 (Joris Kila & James Zeidler eds., 2013) (describing
the use of visual displays and military processions as propaganda to convince
the German masses of total Nazi cultural dominance); Point 23 of The Program
of the N.S.D.A.P. stated: “We demand legal prosecution of artistic and literary
forms which exert a destructive influence on our national life, and the closure of
organizations opposing the above made demands.” Document No. 1708-PS.
Central Publishing House of the N.S.D.A.P.,
http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/25points.asp [http://perma.cc/W5NX7WK2].
29 Fernando Baez, A Universal History of the Destruction of Books: From
Ancient Sumer to Modern-Day Iraq 211 (2008). The Reich Culture Chamber
(Reichskulturkammer) was established in September of 1993 under the
supervision of Joseph Goebbels to “stimulate the Aryanization of German
culture and to prohibit, for example, surrealism, cubism, and Dadaism.” Id.
30 Peter Adam, Art of the Third Reich 56 (1992); accord Jonathan Petropoulos,
The Faustian Bargain: The Art World in Nazi Germany 1-2 (2000).
31 Lynn Nicholas, Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe’s Treasures in The Third
Reich and Second World War 18 (1995).
32 Artworks from both of the Nazi exhibits (“degenerate” and Nazi-approved)
were on exhibition side-by-side at the Neue Galerie Museum for German and
28
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persuade the German people that modern art was “degenerate art
unfit for the sophisticated German master race, which placed value
on classical styles of order and symmetry.” 33
In 1940, Hitler created the Einsatzstab Reichsleither
Rosenberg (“ERR”) for the sole purpose of confiscating and
destroying art in Germany’s occupied territories. 34 The Nazis
plundered Germany and its occupied territories of art. 35 Pillaging of
cultural property, although forbidden by laws dating back to Roman
times, was seen by the victor as a symbol of a successful conquest.36
Not only was stolen art a symbol of the Nazis’ subjugation of the
Jews and Slavs, much of it was valuable and easily transported,
much like the jewelry and currency the Nazis also stole from the
Jews after 1933.37
The ultimate goal of the Nazis was the Aryanization of
Germany’s culture, and all art was subject to “Germanic culture
laws” that mandated the transfer of all property to German citizens
from those individuals deemed by the Nazis not to be true German
citizens, for reasons such as race, ethnicity, religion, or mental
capacity.38 Coerced sales of artworks were used by the Nazis to
Austrian Art in New York. Degenerate Art: The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi
Germany, 1937 (Mar. 13—Sept. 1, 2014),
http://www.neuegalerie.org/content/degenerate-art-attack-modern-art-nazigermany-1937 [http://perma.cc/SQ2Q-URBA]. This was the most the most
recent exhibition of “degenerate art” in the United States since the exhibition of
“Degenerate Art”: Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany in 1991 at the Los
Angeles County Museum of Art.
33 Nicholas, supra note 30.
34 Marc Balcells, Plundering Boys: A Cultural Criminology Assessment of the
Power of Cultural Heritage as a Cause for Plunder in Armed Conflicts Along
History, in Cultural Heritage in the Crosshairs: Protecting Cultural Property
During Conflict 329, 338 (Joris Kila & James Zeidler eds., 2013).
35 See e.g. Nichols, supra note 30; accord Balcells, supra note 33.
36 Balcells, supra note 33 at 340.
37 Michael Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution 202 (2003).
38 Richard Grunberger, The 12 Year Reich: A Social History of Nazi Germany
1933-1945 424-25 (1971).
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further their Aryanization of Germanic culture.39 The Nazis
auctioned much of the confiscated degenerate art in Switzerland and
elsewhere to purge Germany of art it deemed offensive, while
simultaneously making a profit to fund the Third Reich’s
operations.40
Once the Allies became aware of the Nazi pillage and
plunder of Europe’s cultural treasures, they issued the London
Declaration, which memorialized their intent that anyone profiting
from the spoils of this plunder, including neutral countries like
Switzerland, would not go unpunished. 41 The United States also
created the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives agency, also
known as the Monuments Men, who were tasked with protecting
and reclaiming monuments and stolen works during the Allied
advance.42 The Art Looting Investigation Unit also was tasked with
recovering Nazi-looted art under the watch of the Office of Strategic
Services. Despite their successful efforts in recovering thousands of
artworks looted by the Nazis, many artworks remain missing.43
Still, some Allied soldiers stole art, and some of it made it
back to the United States. The American government engaged in
efforts to locate and return any stolen property found in the United
States. The Russian government, however, refused to return the
Balcells, supra note 33 at 338. Germans utilized legal mechanisms of the
Nazi-state to coerce sales from Jewish art dealers and others classified as having
subservient legal rights.
40 Baker, supra note 26 (citing Hitler’s opening speech to the Haus der Kunst
“degenerate art” exhibition); Nicholas, supra note 30, at 4.
41 Multilateral Declaration on Forced Transfers of Property in Enemy Controlled
Territory (“London Declaration”), 3 Bevans 754 (1943), 1943 U.S.T. LEXIS
188.
42 Cheryl White & Thomas Livoti, Cultural Heritage Preservation: A Tool for
Coin, in Cultural Heritage in the Crosshairs: Protecting Cultural Property
During Conflict 195, 202 (Joris Kila & James Zeidler eds., 2013).
43 Stuart Eizenstat, The Unfinished Business of the Unfinished Business of World
War II, in Holocaust Restitution: Perspectives on the Litigation and Its Legacy
297, 307 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2007).
39
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train loads of art stolen by its soldiers, claiming that the art was
compensation for the loss of human and cultural life in Eastern
Europe as a result of Nazi war efforts.
After the war, the Western European nations created special
claims commissions so victims could attempt to reclaim their lost
property. But these commissions generally did not function well for
a multitude of reasons. First, most victims did not have evidence
documenting property ownership because they were forced to flee
in haste under life-threatening circumstances. Second, the Nazi
archives of stolen property were in disarray, destroyed, or still
classified. Third, the Nazis were not the only ones who stole before,
during, and immediately following the war. Fourth, the claim
periods were too short. And, most importantly, many who worked
in these commissions were just as anti-Semitic and biased against
the victims of the Holocaust as were their Nazi predecessors.
In his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ronald
Lauder explained that in the decades following the war, the trade in
stolen art did not wane but rather was continued by museums,
private collectors, and governments who were buying and selling art
that they knew was stolen during the war.44 Mr. Lauder described
this trade as the art world’s “dirty secret.” 45 In her book, Rape of
Europa, Lynn Nicholas described how American museums utilized
middlemen in the art acquisition process.46
Unlike other chattel, valuable fine art has been tracked by
provenance records for centuries. The provenance of an artwork
details the owners and sales. Those who trade and work in the art
world spend a great deal of money and time researching the
The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act—Reuniting Victims with Their
Lost Heritage: Hearing on S. 2763 The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery
Act Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution and
Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts,
114th Cong. 1 (2016) (statement by Ronald S. Lauder).
45 Id.
46 Nicholas, supra note 30.
44
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provenance of a financially valuable work of art to determine both
its history and whether the current owner is the legitimate owner.
Therefore, museums, galleries, and private collectors—even before
the rise of the internet—should have been able to determine when
they were in the possession of an expensive work that was stolen
and sold during the period of Nazi power (1933-1945).
B. The Legal Landscape Prior to the HEAR Act
Due to the lack of information regarding the location of
stolen art, biases against victims in the judicial system, differences
in American and European legal systems, and legal technicalities,
many survivors and their heirs have either chosen not to bring suit
to recover their stolen property or have been unsuccessful in their
efforts to seek restitution.
In most American jurisdictions, a purchaser or donee cannot
acquire title from a thief. 47 Typically in these cases, a court will
award title to the true owner if she sues.48 But if the claim is barred
by statute of limitations, laches, or any other legal or equitable
defense, the present possessor may succeed in keeping the property
without having legal title.49 This prevents the rightful owner from
pursuing recovery of the artwork through traditional remedies such
as replevin or compensatory damages for conversion. The vast
majority rule throughout state and federal courts in the United States
is that a thief and any subsequent purchaser, including those who are
innocent and acting in good faith, do not have title. 50
See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 140-141 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Menzel v.
List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1966)).
48 Id. at 141.
49 Id.
50 E.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 513-515 (N.J. 1980) (Handler, J.
dissenting). (“It is the general rule that ‘a bona fide purchaser of personal
property taken tortiously or wrongfully, as by trespass or theft, does not acquire
a title good against the true owner.’... [I]f the wrongdoer has no title, he or she
cannot convey title; the purchaser acquires only that title reposing in the
transferor….It follows from this well-established principle that, generally, as
47
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New Jersey seems to be an anomaly.51 In New Jersey, title
to stolen art work may transfer to the thief after expiration of the
statute of limitations bars the claim. New Jersey also has rejected
the common law rule that the statute of limitation begins anew with
each subsequent transfer after the theft of personal property and
instead has applied the majority rule for real property requiring
tacking of the statute of limitations to transfers of personal
property.52 This is a serious disadvantage to the rightful owner who
may not realize the work is stolen or may not know of its current
location and possessor while the clock continues to run. Art, like
most chattel, is easily concealable and can pass through many hands
undetected, especially when traded on the black market. 53 These
types of transfers have created a major problem for Holocaust
between the true owner who has lost personal property through theft and a
subsequent good faith purchaser for value, the former is entitled to the goods
over the latter. Title remains in the true owner rather than flowing to the bona
fide purchaser when ‘the wrongdoer sells the chattel to [such] innocent
purchaser . . . because the wrongdoer had [no title] to give.’”) (internal citations
omitted).
51 See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 500-501 (N.J. 1980).
52 Id. at 502-504; 510-511. (Handler, J. dissenting). (“[The majority] rejects the
doctrine that the acquisition of a stolen chattel, or a refusal to return it upon
demand, itself constitutes a tortious conversion as against the true owner….The
New York rule of subsequent conversions, rejected by the majority, is not a
"statute of limitations," but rather is a substantive principle of the law of
torts….It is clearly the predominant view that subsequent transfers of a stolen
chattel constitute separate acts of conversion.”)(Internal citations omitted.) Cf.
Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]n New York, a thief
cannot pass good title….This means that… ‘absent other considerations an
artwork stolen during World War II still belongs to the original owner, even if
there have been several subsequent buyers and even if each of those buyers was
completely unaware that she was buying stolen goods.’”)(internal citations
omitted).
53 See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 496 (N.J. 1980) (“Open and visible
possession of personal property, such as jewelry, may not be sufficient to put
the original owner on actual or constructive notice of the identity of the
possessor. The problem is even more acute with works of art. Like many kinds
of personal property, works of art are readily moved and easily concealed.”)
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survivors and their heirs in their attempts to recover Nazi-looted art.
Nazi-looted art may have passed through many different hands
without a trace (or with altered or fabricated provenance records) or
be stored in a private collection for many decades before the true
owner learns of its whereabouts.54 Even if a stolen work of art is
held by a museum, it is not necessarily on view for the public and
may be kept in storage. Compounding this problem, provenance
records may have been destroyed or altered to reflect a purchase
history more favorable to one of the possessors post-theft.55
Under the civil law system followed throughout Europe, a
good faith purchaser may have title to stolen property after the
passage of a certain period of time, or even immediately as may have
been the law in Switzerland for some time.56 If the rightful owner
succeeds in her claim to the property, then she must reimburse the
good faith purchaser for the price he paid for the property.57
Additionally, the loser pays all attorney’s fees and court costs under
this system, and the filing fee to bring such suits is based on a
See generally Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th
Cir. 2010) (Heir did not know where the paintings were until she was contacted
by a Dutch journalist); Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d
186 (2d Cir. 2019)(Painting held in private collection from 1941 until 1952
when it was donated to museum. Museum’s errors in published provenance
went undetected until 2011 after claim made by heir.); Vineberg v. Bissonnette,
548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008)(Painting held in private family collection for over
sixty-eight years until consigned for sale and heir was notified by Art Loss
Register.).
55 See Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir.
2019)(error in published provenance went undetected until 2011); U.S. v.
Portrait of Wally, 663 F.Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)(altered provenance by
owner); Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. App. 2019)(provenance
altered by former gallery owner); Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d Cir.
2010)(provenance altered by former gallery owner).
56 See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2010). The doctrine of
prescription also may apply in Louisiana. See Dunbar v. Seger- Thomschitz,
615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 2010) (granting summary judgment to collector
on prescription grounds without reaching merits).
57 Id.
54
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percentage of the value of the property. Thus, it is very difficult to
bring suits for recovery of stolen art under this system ,because the
financial burdens are immediate and may eventually the value of the
recovered art. If the claimant is successful, she has paid the filing
fee, which could be substantial if the art has a high market value.
She also must pay the good faith purchaser the price he paid for the
work, which could be a significant number if the purchase was
recent. If the claimant loses, then she will be in a worse financial
position than she was prior to filing suit.
One of the earliest Nazi-looted art restitution cases in the
United States involved a Chagall painting that was left behind when
its Jewish owners, the Menzels, fled Belgium in 1940 after the Nazis
invaded.58 Mrs. Menzel recognized the painting after seeing it in an
art book in 1962 and demanded the owner return the painting. 59
When he refused, Mrs. Menzel filed a replevin action in New York
state court and a jury returned a verdict in her favor.60 However, the
jury also returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Mr. List, who
had impleaded the Perls, the couple who sold him the painting. The
Perls were to reimburse Mr. List for the present value of the painting
and the costs he incurred in defending the lawsuit. 61 The case moved
through the appellate courts in New York, and the state’s highest
court held that the Perls owed Mr. List the full present value of the
painting plus the interest that had incurred since the judgment in
favor of Mrs. Menzel was entered. 62
In 2004, Maria Altmann’s case against the Republic of
Austria brought national attention to the problem Holocaust victims
and their heirs faced when suing a sovereign nation for restitution of
stolen art in the United States. Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, Maria’s
uncle, fled Austria following the Anschluss, leaving behind most of
Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1966).
Id.
60 Id. at 94
61 Id.
62 Id.
58
59
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his possessions, including his art collection. 63 The painting of his
wife by Gustav Klimt, Adele Bloch-Bauer I, along with others in his
collection, was stolen by the Nazis under the pretext that Ferdinand
owed a large tax debt due to tax evasion. 64 The painting ended up in
the possession of the Osterreichishe Galerie Belvedere in Vienna.65
Despite knowing that it was in possession of stolen goods,
the Austrian government refused to return the painting to Ms.
Altmann upon her request and attempted to claim title to the painting
based on the terms of Adele Bloch-Bauer’s will.66 Due to the
painting’s substantial value, Ms. Altman would have been required
to pay a $350,000 filing fee, one third of its value, to bring her suit
in Austria to recover the painting that was rightfully hers pursuant
to her uncle’s will.67 Therefore, she chose to file her case in United
States District Court in California where she only had to pay a $175
filing fee.68 The Republic of Austria claimed it had sovereign
immunity.69 However, Ms. Altmann argued that the provisions of
the FSIA, enacted in 1976, were retroactive to 1945 and applied to
this case.70 The United States Supreme Court ruled in her favor,
finding that the FSIA’s provision that allowed a sovereign nation to
be sued in the United States if it was acting in a commercial capacity
was indeed retroactive and applied to the events that took place in
1945.71

See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. As to the alleged bequest in Adele’s will, Maria Altmann said that her aunt
would never have given Austria the paintings had she known what transpired
during the Anschluss and thereafter. See
https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/music/howard-reich/ct-womangold-reflections-20150404-column.html
67 Altmann, 541 U.S. at 684-685.
68 Id.
69 See Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
70 Id.
71 Id.
63
64
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The case of Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin illustrates a court
blaming a victim for not doing enough to discover art allegedly sold
under duress. In 2006, the Toledo Museum of Art filed suit against
the heirs of Martha Nathan, a Holocaust survivor and prior owner of
Paul Gauguin’s Street Scene in Tahiti.72 The painting was sold in a
forced sale in Switzerland in 1938 along with other works owned by
Ms. Nathan to gain safe passage to the United States for Ms. Nathan
and her family members who were being held hostage. 73 The
museum sought to quiet title to the painting, and the heirs
counterclaimed for conversion and restitution. 74 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the
museum.75 The court concluded that the “the heirs knew [Nathan]
was persecuted by the Nazis and sustained wartime losses,” and
therefore should have made “further inquiries” because the Nazis’
thefts were public knowledge and Ms. Nathan herself had made
prior claims as a victim of the Nazis’ theft. 76 As a result, the court
held that the statute of limitations had expired, thus barring the heirs’
claims for conversion and restitution.77
When Ms. Nathan’s heirs sought return of Vincent Van
Gogh’s The Diggers from the Detroit Institute of Art in 2007, the
museum filed an action in federal court seeking declaratory
judgment.78 This painting was also sold as part of the 1938 forced
sale in Switzerland. 79 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan found that the conversion took place at
the time of sale in 1938, and the Michigan statute of limitations to
recover on a conversion claim expired three years later in 1941. 80
See Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F.Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
Id. at 803.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 807-808.
77 Id.
78 See Detroit Museum of Art v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007).
79 Id.
80 Id. at *3.
72
73
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Unfortunately for Ms. Nathan’s heirs, the court believed the
museum’s assertion that the 1938 sale in Switzerland was voluntary
because it occurred after Ms. Nathan fled Germany for Paris but
prior to the Nazi occupation of France.81
The 2008 case of Vineberg v. Bissonnette offered a ray of
hope to survivors and their heirs when a federal district court in
Rhode Island held that laches was an insufficient defense to a claim
of stolen art.82 Dr. Max Stern, a Jewish gallery owner in Dusseldorf,
Germany, was forced by the Nazis to liquidate his gallery’s
inventory, including a painting by Franz Xaver Winterhaler titled
Girl from the Sabiner Mountains.83 The gallery’s inventory and Dr.
Stern’s personal collection were consigned in 1937 to Lempertz
Auction House, a Nazi-approved dealer, pursuant to a Reich
Chamber order, and the art was auctioned within a few months of
consignment for far less than market value. 84 Dr. Stern fled
Germany shortly thereafter and the Nazi government froze his
assets, including the proceeds of the forced sale by Lempertz
Auction House.85 After the war, Dr. Stern made numerous attempts,
including advertisements and trips to Europe, to recover the stolen
art.86 Unbeknownst to Dr. Stern, Dr. Karl Wilharm purchased the
painting in 1937 from the Lempertz Auction House, and kept it in
his private collection until his step-daughter, Baroness Maria-Louise

Id. See also Jennifer A. Kreder, Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated Art
Recovery Act of 2016, Chapman Law Review at 16 (2017) (“It is not widely
known, however, that the Nazis often forced fleeing Jews to convey their
property located in Switzerland back to the Reich, often in exchange for the
promise of safe passage of other family members that were being held hostage.
As a result, The Diggers is still on display as if Ms. Nathan had the ability to
deal freely in commercial transactions while fleeing from a genocidal regime.”)
(footnote omitted).
82 See Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2008).
83 See Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 529 F.Supp.2d 300 (D.R.I. 2007).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
81
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Bissonnette took possession of it in 1959.87 Dr. Stern died in 1987
and left the painting to his estate. 88 Bissonnette brought the painting
to Rhode Island in 1991, and in 2003, she consigned it with Estates
Unlimited where it was scheduled to be auctioned in 2005.
In 2004, the Stern Estate retained the Art Loss Register to
assist in recovering Dr. Stern’s stolen art and listed the Winterhaler
painting with the Germany’s Lost Art Internet Database.89 The Art
Loss Register informed the Stern Estate of the auction, and the
Estate filed a claim with New York’s Holocaust Claims Processing
Office.90 The Holocaust Claims Processing Office demanded that
Bissonnette return the painting to the Stern Estate.91 When she
refused to return it and negotiations failed, Bissonnette shipped the
painting back to Germany and filed an action in Germany’s courts
to determine ownership. 92 The Stern Estate filed suit in United
States District Court in Rhode Island seeking replevin, or, in the
alternative, damages.93
The District Court granted the Stern Estate’s motion for
summary judgment and ordered replevin of the painting to the
Estate, rejecting Bissonnette’s laches defense due to Dr. Stern’s
efforts to locate the painting and Bissonnette’s lack of evidence that
she was prejudiced by the delay.94 Finding Dr. Stern’s efforts to
locate the painting were reasonable, the Court noted that “[u]nder
these circumstances, to require that Dr. Stern list every item lost in
any attempt he made to locate the lost artwork would be
unreasonable. The ‘standard is not whether [Dr. Stern] did
everything that might have been done with the benefit of hindsight,
but whether [his] efforts were reasonable given the facts of the
Id. at 303.
Id.
89 Id. at 304.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
87
88
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case.’”95 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed the District Court’s ruling finding that Bissonnette did not
meet the burden of proof of evidence-based prejudice required to
support her laches defense. 96 The First Circuit concluded: “A de
facto confiscation of a work of art that arose out of a notorious
exercise of man’s inhumanity to man now ends with the righting of
that wrong through the mundane application of common law
principles. The mills of justice grind slowly, but they grind
exceedingly fine.”97
The Austrian government’s extortion of Holocaust victims
seeking restitution of Holocaust-expropriated art came to light in
2009 in U.S. v. Portrait of Wally.98 Portrait of Wally, a gouache by
Egon Schiele, was subpoenaed in 1998 by the U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York while it was on loan from the
Leopold Museum in Austria for exhibition at the Museum of
Modern Art in New York.99 In 1999, the U.S. government seized
the painting pursuant to a warrant and filed a civil forfeiture action
on the grounds that the painting was stolen property knowingly
shipped into the country by the Leopold Museum in violation of the
National Stolen Property Act. 100 The painting’s rightful owner was
Lea Bondi Jaray. 101 Bondi was a Jewish gallery owner who fled
Austria with her husband for England following the Anschluss.102
Just prior to their escape, Friedrich Welz, a Nazi to whom Bondi
was forced to sell her art gallery pursuant to Aryanization laws
prohibiting Jews from owning businesses, demanded that Bondi
give him Wally.103 Bondi initially refused, but ultimately relented
Id. at 309 (citing Erisoty v. Rizik, No. Civ. A. 93-6215, 1995 WL 91406 at
*14 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 23, 1995) (footnote omitted)).
96 Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2008).
97 Id. at 58-59.
98 See U.S. v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F.Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
99 Id. at 237-238.
100 Id. at 246.
101 Id. at 238.
102 Id.
103 Id.
95
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after her husband warned her that Welz may inhibit their escape. 104
After the war, Bondi was able to recover her gallery from Welz
because it had been seized by U.S. troops, but Wally was returned to
the Austrian National Gallery (“The Belvedere”) by mistake. 105
Bondi was unsuccessful in her attempts to convince The Belvedere
to return the painting to her. 106 When Dr. Rudolph Leopold, an
Austrian collector, approached Bondi in 1953 to inquire about other
Schiele works, she told him about Wally and he agreed to help her
get the painting back.107 However, Leopold traded The Belvedere
one of his Schiele works in exchange for Wally, and kept Wally in
his private collection.108 After Bondi learned of Leopold’s scheme,
she attempted to convince him through her lawyers to return the
painting, but was unsuccessful.109 Dr. Leopold donated Wally along
with the rest of his collection to the Leopold Museum in 1994. 110
During the pendency of the case, it was discovered that the
Austrian government utilized a scheme requiring claimants seeking
the return of expropriated artworks in Austria’s possession to make
“donations” to the Austrian government in exchange for export
permits for the artworks to be returned. 111 After a protracted legal
battle and an unfavorable ruling for the museum setting the case for
trial, the Leopold Museum settled the case with Bondi’s heirs in
2010 for $19 million in exchange for the painting.112 The U.S.
Attorney’s Office issued a press release about the settlement, noting
Id.
Id. at 240.
106 Id. at 242. The Belevedere was the same Austrian museum that refused to
return the stolen Klimt paintings in its collection to Ms. Altmann, thus forcing
her to take legal action. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, supra note
107 Id. at 243.
108 Id. at 243-244.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 245.
111 See Kreder, supra note 80, at 11.
112 See United States Attorney Southern District of New York Press Release,
dated July 20, 2010.
https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/July10/portraitofwallyse
ttlementpr.pdf
104
105
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that “the civil forfeiture action brought public attention to the
struggle of victims of Nazi crimes to recover art and other property
stolen by the Nazis.”113 As part of the settlement, the museum
agreed that a plaque detailing its true provenance would always be
displayed next to the painting.114
While Wally was pending in New York, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided the case of Von Saher
v. Norton Simon Museum of Art in 2009.115 Marei von Saher, heir
of Dutch art dealer Jacques Goudstikker, filed suit against the
Norton Simon Museum Art for return of two paintings by Lucas
Cranach the Elder.116 Goudstikker fled the Netherlands with his
family after the Nazi invasion, leaving behind his art collection
which included the Cranach paintings and works by other wellknown artists such as Rembrandt and van Gogh. 117 The Nazis
confiscated the works, and Hermann Goering kept most of the
collection, including the Cranach paintings, at his country estate
until they were discovered by Allied Forces. 118 The Goudstikker
collection was returned to the Netherlands by the Allied Forces, but
the Dutch government returned the Cranach paintings to another
claimant instead of Goudstikker and this claimant sold them to the
Norton Simon Museum.119 After von Saher filed her complaint, the
museum filed a motion to dismiss that was granted by the United
States District Court on the grounds that the California statute
extending the statute of limitations was unconstitutional and von
Saher’s complaint had not been filed within the three year statute of

Id. at 3. See also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, supra note
See https://itsartlaw.org/2010/07/30/19-million-settlement-frees-portrait-ofwally-after-13-year-of-legal-disputes/
115 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, 578 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009),
amended and superseded on denial of reh'g en banc by No. 07-56691, 592 F.3d
954 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Von Saher I”).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
113
114
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limitations required under the prior statute. 120 Von Saher appealed
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the
statute was unconstitutional due to the Federal Government’s field
preemption in foreign affairs. 121 The Supreme Court of the United
States denied von Saher’s petition for certiorari. 122
As federal courts were ruling against survivors in this
terrible history of cases, the United States maintained that its foreign
policy with regard to Holocaust expropriated art was consistent with
the Washington Principles. The State Department entered into the
Terezin Declaration in 2009, which renewed and reaffirmed the
principles agreed upon at the Washington Conference in 1998.123
Despite this renewed commitment by the federal government to
ensure that these claims were adjudicated on the merits and not
decided on purely procedural defenses, unlawful owners continued
to prevail in federal court.124
Prior to the HEAR Act, the only Congressional legislation to
address restitution issues were the U.S. Holocaust Assets
Id.
Id.
122 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).
123 See The Holocaust Era Assets Conference Terezin Declaration 4, Holocaust
Era Assets Conference (June 30, 2009),
http://www.holocausteraassets.eu/program/conferenceproceedings/declarations/.
124 See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2010) (Laches defense
successful in claim for Egon Schiele drawing even though current owner could
not prove title. Issue of diligence in proving claims.) and Museum of Fine Arts
of Boston v. Seiger-Thomschitz (2010) (“innocent transfer,” no bad faith, laches
or unclean hands). See also Kreder, supra note 80, at 18 (“When a museum as
esteemed as the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, asserts the statute of limitations,
it renders the Washington Principles and Terezin Declaration all but
meaningless. Other American museums have asserted the statute of limitations
against claimants in court and/or sued survivors to shut down their inquiries on
technical defenses like laches….They shut down any judicial inquiry into the
merits of the survivors’ heirs [sic] claims. They undermine the credibility of the
United States as a leader seeking justice for Holocaust victims and their heirs.”)
(footnote omitted).
120
121
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Commission Act of 1988 and the Holocaust Victims Redress Act.125
This legislation was largely ineffective and is discussed infra.
II. THE HEAR ACT
A. Legislative History
Initially drafted in early 2016 as bipartisan-sponsored
legislation, the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act was
signed into law by President Barack Obama on December 16,
2016.126 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Von Saher was the impetus
for the Act.127 In consideration of the bill, Congress looked at the
history and effectiveness of prior efforts by the United States to
ensure fair adjudication of Nazi-looted art claims, including the
Washington Conference Principles, the Terezin Declaration, the
standards adopted by the Alliance of American Museums, the
Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the U.S. Holocaust Assets
Commission Act of 1998.128

See U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-186
(1998)(“To establish a commission to examine issues pertaining to disposition
of Holocaust-era assets in the United States before, during, and after World War
II, and to make recommendations to the President on further action, and for
other purposes.”) and Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158
(1998)(“To provide redress for inadequate restitution of assets seized by the
United States Government during World War II which belonged to victims of
the Holocaust, and for other purposes.”).
126 After President Obama signed HEAR into law, Ronald S. Lauder, chairman
of the Commission for Art Recovery and the World Jewish Restitution
Organization, stated: “The HEAR Act will end an enduring injustice for
Holocaust victims and their families. For too long, governments, museums,
auction houses and unscrupulous collectors allowed this egregious theft of
culture and heritage to continue, imposing legal barriers like arbitrary statutes of
limitations to deny families prized possessions stolen from them by the Nazis.”
https://web.archive.org/web/20180104140428/http://www.newsweek.com/obam
a-hear-act-law-holocaust-534793
127 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 5 (2016).
128 Id.
125
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After reviewing these prior efforts, Congress concluded that
the “United States has not fulfilled its promise to ensure that claims
to art lost in the Holocaust are resolved on their merits.”129 Reciting
language from the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Von Saher I, Congress
noted that obstacles faced by these claimants include “procedural
hurdles such as statute of limitations that prevent the merits of
claims from being adjudicated.”130 Congress expressed concern that
“State statutes of limitations can be an unfair impediment to the
victims and their heirs, contrary to United States policy. Yet states
have been unable to remedy this injustice because the regulation of
war-related disputes is within the powers of the Federal
Government.”131
Based on its findings, Congress concluded that “a Federal
limitations period, appropriately tailored to the unique
circumstances of Holocaust-era claims, is therefore needed to
guarantee that the United States fulfills the promises it has made to
the world to facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Naziconfiscated and looted art and to make certain that claims to recover
such art are resolved expeditiously and based on the facts and merits
of the claims.”132
The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on April 7, 2016, and a hearing was conducted on June 7,
2016, by the Subcommittees on the Constitution and Oversight,
Agency Action, Federal Rights, and Federal Courts. 133 During the
hearing, the Committee heard testimony from various experts in the
field of Holocaust expropriated art. 134 In September 2016, the
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted)(internal quotations omitted).
133 Id. at 6.
134Id. Dr. Agnes Peresztegi, the Executive Director for the Commission for Art
Recovery Europe, testified that the “Committee should consider that the HEAR
Act would not achieve its purpose of enabling claimants to come forward if it
eliminates one type of procedural obstacle in order to replace it with another. To
129
130
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Senate amended the bill to include language “favoring the resolution
of disputed art claims without litigation and using alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms involving experts in art research.”135
Additional amendments included specific descriptions of the types
of art covered under the Act, a broadened knowledge standard for
the trigger of the statute of limitations, broad coverage for all groups
persecuted by the Nazis, an exception for claims previously barred,
and a sunset date. 136 The Senate also removed the definition of
“unlawfully lost,” which the House of Representatives defined as
“theft, seizure, forced sale, sale under duress, or any other loss of an
artwork or cultural property that would not have occurred absent
persecution during the Nazi era.”137
The most significant
amendment, however, was the removal of the bar on the availability
of equitable defenses, including the doctrine of laches, to those
defending against these claims.138
cite some concerns: narrowing the definition of looted art, shifting the burden of
proof unnecessarily in some instances to the claimant; and generally adding or
confirming other procedural obstacles. Cases related to Holocaust looted art
should only be adjudicated on the merits.” Holocaust Expropriated Art
Recovery Act: Hearing on S. 2763 Before the S. Comm. on the Constitution,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts,
114th Cong. 1 (2016)(testimony of Agnes Peresztegi). Unfortunately, the
Senate amended the bill to remove the language precluding the use of laches,
which is precisely what Dr. Peresztegi advised against. See S. Rep. No. 114394, at 7 (2016).
135 Id. at 6.
136 Id. at 7.
137 Id. By including equitable defenses and laches and removing the definition
of “unlawfully lost,” this amendment appears to contradict the stated purpose of
this Act to ensure that these claims “are resolved in a just and fair manner” in
accordance with U.S. foreign policy. This is outside the scope of this article,
but this issue has been addressed in other scholarly articles. See generally
Jennifer A. Kreder, Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of
2016, 20 Chap. L. Rev. 1 (2017); and Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, The Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016: An Ineffective Remedy for Returning
Nazi-Looted Art, U. Ill. L. Rev. 363 (2019).
138 Id. Prior to the amendments, Section 5(a) of Senate bill originally read:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, any provision of State
law, or any defense at law or equity relating to the passage of time (including
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B. The Provisions
i. Congressional Findings
As a result of its investigation, Congress determined that
“Federal legislation is needed because the only court that has
considered the question held that the U.S. Constitution prohibits
States from making exceptions to their statutes of limitations to
accommodate claims involving the recovery of Nazi-confiscated
art.”139 Thus, the Act “expresses [Congress’] sense that the private
resolution of claims by parties involved, on the merits and through
the use of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation panels
established for this purpose with the aid of experts in provenance
research and history, will yield just and fair resolutions in a more
efficient and predictable manner.”140
ii. Purpose
The stated purpose of the HEAR Act is twofold:
“(i) [F]irst, to ensure that laws governing claims art and cultural
property confiscated by the Nazis further United Policy as expressed
in the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art,
the Holocaust Victims Redress Act and the Terezin Declaration; (ii)
second, to ensure that claims are not unfairly barred by statutes of
limitations and are resolved in a just and fair manner.”141 This
section clearly establishes the intent of Congress to regulate in the
area of Holocaust-expropriated art, due to the “unique
the doctrine of laches)….” S. 2763, 114th Cong. 2D § 5(a) (April 7, 2016).
139 HEAR
140 Id.
141 Id.
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circumstances” of these claims stemming directly from the horrific
events of World War II.142
iii. Definitions
The Act defines actual discovery as “knowledge,” which, in
turn, is defined as “having actual knowledge of a fact or
circumstance or sufficient information with regard to a relevant fact
or circumstance to amount to actual knowledge thereof.”143 The
Senate Judiciary Committee clarified that “for the purposes of the
limitations period established in Section 5(a), this is intended to
require more than access to the information with regard to relevant
facts and circumstances. The party must have the knowledge itself
or have sufficient information to constitute actual knowledge.” 144
This is a significant change as many state statutes only require
constructive knowledge, which can be imputed to a victim’s heir. 145
Neither constructive nor imputed knowledge are included in the
HEAR Act.
Art covered under the Act includes fine art, graphic art,
applied art, books, music, photographs, cinematographic archives
and mediums, sacred and ceremonial objects, and Judaica stolen or
lost during the covered period. 146 The period for losses covered
under the Act is from the rise of the Nazis in January 1, 1933 through

Id.
Id.
144 Id.
145 See Simon J. Frankel & Sari Sharoni, Navigating the Ambiguities and
Uncertainties of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 42
Colum. J.L. & Arts 157, 163 (2019) (“Many states have limitations periods that
run from when the original owner knew or should have known (that is, had
constructive knowledge) of the whereabouts of the stolen property. Even in
those states where the statute of limitations begins upon “knowledge” of the
claim, different elements may suffice to constitute knowledge.”)(footnote
omitted).
146 HEAR
142
143
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the end of World War II in December 31, 1945.147 The limitations
period applies to any group who was persecuted by the Nazis, their
allies, agents, or associates and lost art as a result of this persecution
during the covered period.148 The Senate report noted that Nazi
persecution was not carried out by the Nazis alone, but also the
German government, Germany’s allies, and “private agents and
others.”149 Congress has clearly recognized that there are many
groups who were persecuted by the Nazis and their co-conspirators.
It also has recognized that these co-conspirators were not members
of the Nazi party, but nevertheless assisted the Nazis in furtherance
of their “Final Solution.”
iv. Federal Statute of Limitations
Section 5 is the key provision of the Act setting forth the
applicable Federal statute of limitations for Holocaust expropriated
art claims. Subsection (a) defines the statute of limitations period:

(a) In general—
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or
State law or any defense at law relating to the
passage of time, and except as otherwise provided
in this section, a civil claim or cause of action
against a defendant to recover any artwork or other
property that was lost during the covered period
because of Nazi persecution may be commenced
not later than 6 years after the actual discovery by
the claimant or the agent of the claimant of—
(1) the identity and location of the artwork or other
property; and
(2) a possessory interest of the claimant in the artwork
or other property.150

HEAR
HEAR
149 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 9 (2016).
150 HEAR
147
148
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The statute of limitations under the Act is six years after the
actual discovery by the claimant or the claimant’s agents or heirs.
The Senate Judiciary Committee noted that “the purpose of this
section is to open courts to claimants to bring covered claims and
have them resolved on the merits, consistent with the Terezin
Declaration. While defenses at law are not merely procedural, the
special circumstances created by the Nazi persecution necessitate an
opportunity for their temporary waiver.”151 Section 5 applies to
claims pending on the date of enactment and those filed from the
period of the date of enactment through December 31, 2026.152
v. Limitations on the HEAR Act
Subsection (b) addresses issues with misidentification and
clarifies that the statute of limitations only begins to run on the date
actual knowledge occurs, i.e. when the claimant has sufficient facts
to establish that the work is the one that was stolen during the
covered period.153
Pursuant to subsection (c), a claim is deemed actually
discovered on the date of enactment under the following
circumstances:
(1) before the date of enactment of this Act—
(A) a claimant had knowledge of the elements set
forth in subsection (a); and
(B) the civil claim or cause of action was barred by
a Federal or State statute of limitations; or
(2)(A) before the date of enactment of this Act, a
claimant had knowledge of the elements set forth in
subsection (a); and
S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 9 (2016).
HEAR
153 HEAR
151
152
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(B) on the date of enactment of this Act, the civil
claim or cause of action was not barred by a Federal
or State statute of limitations. 154
This subsection allows “claimants to resuscitate claims that may
have been barred in the past,” but does not affect claims that have
already been adjudicated to final judgment “from which no appeal
lies on the date of enactment.” 155 The statute of limitations period
also applies to those claims that are known on the date of enactment,
but not yet barred.156
The HEAR Act limitations period does not pertain to claims
barred by a Federal or State statute of limitation on the day before
the enactment if the claimant had the requisite knowledge required
under subsection (a) on or after January 1, 1999 and “not less than
6 years have passed” since the claimant obtained the requisite
knowledge and during that time, the claim was not barred by a
statute of limitations.157 In other words, a claimant who had
knowledge of a claim on or after January 1, 1999 cannot bring a
claim under the HEAR act limitation period if 6 or more years have
passed since she obtained the requisite knowledge. But, this
exception does not “[bar] the claimant from asserting claims that
remain timely under applicable State law.”158 Congress included
this exception because it “recognizes the importance of quieting title
in property generally and the importance that claimants assert their
rights in a timely fashion.”159 The Senate Judiciary Committee
explained how this exception should operate:
“The six year period in subsection 5(e) reflects that
in subsection 5(a), but it is not intended to extend
HEAR
S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 10 (2016).
156 Id.
157 HEAR
158 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 10 (2016).
159 Id.
154
155
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shorter limitations periods that came and went prior
to the enactment of the HEAR Act. For instance, if
the relevant conditions are met and the claim arose
after 1999; the applicable limitations period was
three years; and three years elapsed before the HEAR
Act was enacted, the claim would fall under the 5(e)
exception. The claimant must have had, however, an
opportunity to bring a claim that was not time-barred
during that six year period.”160
While the language of this exception is somewhat confusing,
it appears that the purpose of this subsection is to encourage
claimants to bring their claims in a timely manner. The exception is
similar to a laches defense but not exactly the same. The exception
requires a demonstration by the one asserting the defense that the
claimant had the “opportunity” within the requisite six year period
to bring a claim that would not have been ruled time-barred.
Seemingly, this “opportunity” depends upon the applicable statute
of limitations as interpreted by the courts through the date the claim
arose, which varies from state to state.161 In any event, as
demonstrated above, the cases were being decided against survivors

Id. at 11.
See generally Simon J. Frankel & Sari Sharoni, Navigating the HEAR Act of
2016, 42 Colum. J.L. & Arts 157 (2019) (discussing interpretative issues with
HEAR Act); Jason Barnes, Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act
of 2016: A Federal Reform to State Statutes of Limitations for Art Restitution
Claims, Colum. J. Transnational Law (discussing implication that HEAR Act
interferes with states’ traditional domain over statute of limitations in regard to
property rights); Jennifer A. Kreder, Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated
Art Recovery Act of 2016, 20 Chap. L. Rev. 1 (2017) (arguing the HEAR Act
eliminates the complex choice of law problem faced by courts as well as the
laches defense); and Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, The Holocaust Expropriated Art
Recovery Art of 2016: An Ineffective Remedy for Returning Nazi-Looted Art, U.
Ill. Rev. 363 (2019) (arguing the extension of statute of limitations in the HEAR
Act does not go far enough and recommending further action such as extending
sunset of the HEAR Act).
160
161
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at every step of the way since Altmann came down in the Supreme
Court in 2004.
The Act concludes with an express statement that it does not
create any claim or new Federal or state cause of action.162 All
claims must be filed before the sunset of the Act on January 1,
2027.163
vi. Construction of the HEAR Act
The language used by Congress in the operative provision of
Section 5 (a) establishing the uniform statute of limitations is
permissive: “a civil claim…may be commenced not later than 6
years….[emphasis added]”164
Mandatory language (“shall”)
appears only in the text of subsections (b) through (f) in Section 5.
As discussed supra, these later subsections set forth the limitations
on the Act: possible misidentification, pre-existing claims,
exceptions, applicability, and the sunset date. Thus, mandatory
language would be necessary to define the limitations set forth in
these sections. Presumably, Congress chose to utilize permissive
language in Section 5 (a) because there is a wide variance of time
periods allowed under existing state statutes of limitations165 and the
Act itself does not create any cause of action. 166 Thus, the HEAR
HEAR
HEAR
164 HEAR. See also Frankel and Sharoni, supra note 159, at 174. (“courts
should construe the ambiguity of ‘may be commenced’ to allow claims to be
brought that remain timely under applicable state statutes of limitations, such as
under New York’s demand and refusal rule.”).
165 See also Frankel and Sharoni, supra note 159.
166 Although it is outside the scope of this article, retroactive application is
acceptable and clear, see e.g., Altmann. See Emily J. Cunningham, Justice on
the Merits: An Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of
2016, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 427, ___ (2018) (“Procedural changes might be
impermissibly retroactive if they create a new cause of action based on old
conduct. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, the Supreme
Court found that Congress could not create a cause of action against conduct
occurring before a statute’s enactment where no cause of action previously
162
163
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Act does not command the States to take any action in regard to their
statute of limitations, but rather extends the window of opportunity
to assert claims thereby opening the courts to victims and their heirs.
C. The Legal Landscape Since the Enactment of the HEAR Act
Since the enactment of HEAR, the New York Supreme
Court Appellate Division and the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit have
considered the HEAR Act. Two recent cases illustrate the divergent
outcomes.
In June 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court
dismissing Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art.167
existed. The case addressed whether private parties could sue on behalf of the
United States for pre-1986 conduct under a 1986 amendment to the False
Claims Act, which previously barred the claims at issue in the case. While
Congress couched the amendment’s language in jurisdictional terms, the
Supreme Court applied the presumption against retroactivity to bar its
application to pre-1986 conduct. The Court refined its statement in Landgraf
that jurisdictional statutes speaking to the “power of the court” to hear a case are
not retroactive by distinguishing between situations that qualify as an exception
to the general presumption and a separate exception altogether. Jurisdictional
statutes that “create [] jurisdiction where none previously existed” concern
parties' substantive rights and hence are subject to the presumption against
retroactivity. A court might interpret HEAR to present a new cause of action.
Instead of transferring jurisdiction from one court to another, HEAR restores
opportunities previously barred. While technically HEAR does not create a
cause of action and was not intended to do so, like Hughes Aircraft's
amendment, HEAR arguably creates jurisdiction that did not exist prior to its
enactment. However, HEAR does not create a cause of action because the
underlying offense of conversion applied at the time of the thefts; instead,
HEAR restores a claimant's procedural opportunity to present its cause of action
before a court. Under Hughes Aircraft, if HEAR creates a cause of action,
HEAR is subject to the presumption of retroactivity, which Congress may
overcome through express language.).
167 See Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir.
2019).
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Laurel Zuckerman, the great-grandniece of Paul and Alice
Leffmann and heir to their estate, sought replevin of Pablo Picasso’s
The Actor, a painting owned by the Leffmanns until they were
forced to sell it to escape Nazi-occupied Europe in 1938.168 The
Leffmanns were wealthy Jewish industrialists who fled Nazi
Germany in 1937 for Italy only to discover that Italy was just as
dangerous.169 After being stripped of their assets by the Nazis
pursuant to the Nuremburg Laws, the Leffmanns had to pay an
enormous flight tax on their flight from Germany.170 Before fleeing
to Italy, the Leffmanns sent The Actor to storage in Switzerland.171
Desperate for cash to flee Italy, the Leffmanns sold The Actor to
Käte Perls and Paul Rosenberg, Paris art dealers, for $12,000 in
1938 after turning down another offer for the same amount. 172 The
Leffmanns needed the money to fund their escape through
Switzerland and on to Brazil, which would require payment of both
substantial taxes and bribes to ensure their safety.173 After the war
ended, the Leffmanns were successful in some of their claims for
property looted by the Nazis before they fled Germany, but they did
not seek return of The Actor.174 In 1939, the painting was insured
for $18,000 by Rosenberg. 175 Then, just three years after the
Leffmanns sold it, Chrysler heiress and art collector Thelma
Chrysler Foy purchased the painting from a New York gallery for
$22,500.176 Foy donated the painting to The Metropolitan Museum
of Art in 1952.177

Id.
Id.
170 Zuckerman Pet. Rehrg. En Banc, Case no. 18-634 Doc. 173 at 30 (July 10,
2019).
171 Zuckerman, 928 F.3d.
172 Id. at 191.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 191-192.
175 Id. at 192.
176 Id.
177 Id.
168
169
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In accordance with New York’s demand and refusal rule,
Ms. Zuckerman made a demand for the return of the painting in
2010, but The Met refused to return it.178 Zuckerman then filed suit
alleging conversion and seeking replevin due to duress based on the
Leffmanns’ forced sale of the painting in 1938 to fund their escape
from the growing Nazi threat in Europe.179 The District Court
dismissed her claims on the defendant’s motion to dismiss finding
“failure to allege duress under New York law.”180 Zuckerman
appealed to the Second Circuit, but in its de novo review, the court
focused on the defendant museum’s defense of laches not addressed
by the District Court.181 Finding unreasonable delay by Zuckerman
and prejudice to the museum, the court affirmed the judgment of the
lower court.182 The Second Circuit based its determination of
unreasonable delay on the fact that over seventy years had passed
between the sale of the painting and Zuckerman’s demand with no
prior attempts to recover the painting made by the Leffmanns or
anyone acting on their behalf.183 Further, the Second Circuit
deemed the Leffmanns to be a “financially sophisticated couple”
because they successfully recovered other Nazi-looted property
after the war, and thus determined it was highly implausible that
they or their heirs had not sought return of the painting earlier.184
Rejecting Zuckerman’s claim that the painting was sold under
duress during the period of Nazi power, the court noted that “[t]his
is not a case where the identity of the buyer was unknown to the
seller or the lost property was difficult to locate. Indeed, the
Painting was a “masterwork” of Picasso, not an obscure piece of art.
Nor is this a case where the plaintiff alleges that the buyers
themselves exerted any undue or improper pressure on the seller.” 185
Id.
Id.
180 Id.
181 Zuckerman Pet. Rehrg. En Banc, Case 18-634 Doc. 173 at 2 (July 10, 2019).
182 Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d at 193-195.
183 Id. at 193-194.
184 Id. at 194.
185 Id.
178
179
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The court also held that The Met was prejudiced due to Zuckerman’s
delay, but pointed to no specific evidence of prejudice other than the
delay was unreasonable since the painting had been in the museum’s
collection since 1952.186
Most surprisingly, the Second Circuit held that the Supreme
Court precedents of Petrella and SCA Hygiene did not apply to the
HEAR Act, because the text of the HEAR Act only prohibits
defenses at law and “allowing defendants to assert a laches
defense…comports with the legislative scheme advanced by the
HEAR Act.”187 The court noted that “[u]nlike a mechanical
application of a statute of limitations, a laches defense requires a
careful analysis of the respective positions of the parties in search of
a just and fair solution.”188 But, in its search for this “just and fair
solution,” the court focused solely on the plaintiff’s delay in
bringing her claim and overlooked evidence of the museum’s
unclean hands.189 After being denied rehearing en banc, Zuckerman
Id. at 190. The Met was gifted the painting so there were no expenditures for
purchase, only costs for insurance and maintenance from 1952 to the present. It
is possible the painting may have lost some value in 2010 when a visitor tripped
and fell into it causing an almost six inch tear. The museum repaired the
painting in-house. See
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/arts/design/21picasso.html
187 Id. at 196. The Second Circuit relied heavily upon Frankel and Sharoni’s
article in its analysis of HEAR, quoting their interpretation that Congress’
removal of language precluding the laches defense from the final bill “may be
presumed that the limitation was not intended.” Zuckerman, 928 F.3d at 197
(internal citations omitted).
188 Id.
189 Id. See generally Zuckerman Pet. Rehrg. En Banc Case 18-634 Doc. 173 at 2
(July 10, 2019) (museum’s published provenance showing Leffmann did not
own the painting at the time of the sale in 1938 was “manifestly erroneous for
45 years” and was not corrected until Zuckerman made inquiries in 2011). It is
important to note here that The Met had several former Monuments Men,
including Capt. James Joseph Rorimer, on staff when the museum received the
painting. At the time of Foy’s gift in 1952, Capt. Rorimer was the Director of
the Cloisters for the museum. He later became Director of The Met in 1955, a
position he remained in until his death in 1966. As a former Monuments Man
and an art historian, Capt. Rorimer certainly knew the importance of keeping
186
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filed her petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court on January 24, 2020.190
Less than two weeks after the Second Circuit’s ruling in
Zuckerman, New York’s highest state court held that the laches
defense did not bar the plaintiff’s claims of replevin and conversion
and affirmed the lower court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in
Reif v. Nagy.191 Timothy Reif and David Frankel, heirs of Jewish
art collector and Holocaust victim Fritz Grunbaum, 192 filed a lawsuit
alleging conversion and replevin in New York state court in 2016
against Richard Nagy and his gallery, seeking the return of two
works by Egon Schiele stolen from Grunbaum by the Nazis in
1938.193 The Nazis used a power of attorney signed by Grunbaum
accurate provenance records, possessed specialized knowledge and training in
U.S. foreign policy regarding Nazi-looted art, and had first-hand experience
returning Nazi-looted art to its rightful owners. See
https://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/rorimer-capt-james-j and
https://www.metmuseum.org/blogs/now-at-the-met/2014/in-the-footsteps-ofthe-monuments-men.
190 The questions presented in Zuckerman’s petition for writ of certiorari are: “1.
Whether the nonstatutory defense of laches may bar an action to recover
artwork lost because of Nazi persecution, where that action has been brought
within the statute of limitations prescribed by Congress in the Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016? 2. Whether an action may be
dismissed for laches at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage without discovery or exploration
of factual disputes about the laches defense?” Zuckerman Pet. Cert. at i
(January 24, 2020).
191 Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107, 109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
192 Fritz Grunbaum was a Jewish cabaret star and well-known art collector who
was arrested by the Nazis while attempting to escape Austria in the weeks
following the Anschluss. He was imprisoned at the Buchenwald and Dachau
concentration camps, where he was murdered in 1941. While Grunbaum was
imprisoned, the Nazis inventoried the couple’s property, appointed an Aryan
trustee to oversee their assets (and to whom Elisabeth was required to pay a
substantial fee), and evicted Elisabeth from her apartment. Elisabeth survived
Fritz, but was murdered in a Nazi death camp in 1942. Elisabeth’s sister,
Mathilde Lukacses, escaped Austria with her husband and survived the war.
See Reif, 175 A.D.3d at 109-112.
193 Reif and Frankel are the legal heirs of the claimants in Bakalar v. Vavra. An
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while he was imprisoned at Dachau to force his wife Elisabeth to
allow inventory of Grunbaum’s prolific art collection which
included 81 works by Schiele and other well-known artists such as
Rodin, Rembrandt, and Degas.194 The Nazis valued the collection
to be worth 5791 Reichsmarks and seized it under the Reich’s laws
declaring Jewish assets to be property of the state.195 When Nagy
acquired the paintings in 2011 and 2013, he was aware that there
were issues with the provenance of the works, including that the
Grunbaum heirs made a claim to at least one of the paintings. 196
Nagy and his gallery, through their experts, argued that
Elisabeth’s sister, Mathilde Lukacses, was the owner based on the
provenance, most likely through an intervivos gift made by one of
the Grunbaums.197 The court rejected this argument as speculative
given the evidence that the provenance was altered by a former
gallery owner and the paintings never left Austria. 198 Finding prima
facie evidence that the paintings were never in the possession of
Mathilde, the court determined that the paintings belonged to the
Grunbaums.199 In response to the defendants’ bold assertion that
Grunbaum’s power of attorney was voluntary, the court stated that
“[w]e reject the notion that a person who signs a power of attorney
in a death camp can be said to have executed the document
voluntarily.”200 Thus, the court held that all subsequent transfers of

Austrian court declared in 2002 that Vavra (Fritz’s heir) and Fischer
(Elisabeth’s heir) were the legal heirs to Grunbaum’s estate. See Reif, 175
A.D.3d at 113-114. In that Bakalar, Vavra and Fischer sought return of another
Schiele work in Grunbaum’s collection, Seated Woman with a Bent Leg, but the
Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal on the basis of laches.
See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d. Cir. 2010).
194 Reif, 175 A.D.3d at 110.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 118.
197 Id. at 129. One of the defense experts, Lillie, admitted there was no evidence
of such a gift to Mathilde. Id. at 122, note 24.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 126-127.
200 Id. at 129 (internal citations omitted).
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the artworks were invalid because Grunbaum had executed his
power of attorney under duress.201
The court also rejected the defendants’ laches defense,
because there was no evidence of prejudice to the defendants. 202
Specifically, the court determined that there was “no change in
position” since the defendants purchased the paintings in 2013; the
defendants had notice of the Grunbaum heirs’ claims before the
paintings were purchased; the defendants purchased the paintings at
a discount; and the defendants bought title insurance to protect
against challenges.203 Concluding its opinion, the court noted that
the HEAR Act and New York’s public policy to prevent art theft
informed its findings.204 The court was careful to note that it was
not making “a declaration…that plaintiffs established the estate’s
absolute title,” but that it was “adjudicating the parties’ respective
superior ownership and possessory interests. We find that plaintiffs
have met their burden of proving superior title to the Artworks.
Defendants raise no triable issue of fact.” 205
In sum, the Second Circuit found the HEAR Act did not
apply in Zuckerman and affirmed dismissal based on evidence of
laches, while the New York state court relied on the evidence of
duress and the purpose of the HEAR Act to inform its findings and
rejection of the defendants’ laches defense. Thus, the New York
state court decided Reif solely on the merits as the HEAR Act
recommends, while the Second Circuit rejected the HEAR Act and
dismissed Zuckerman due to a procedural defense with no
consideration of the merits of Zuckerman’s claim.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

Id. at 129.
Id. at 130-131.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 131-132.
205 Id. at 132.
201
202
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In Von Saher I, the Ninth Circuit held that California’s
statute extending the statute of limitations for claims of Holocaustexpropriated art was unconstitutional because it infringed upon the
Federal Government’s exclusive foreign affairs powers.206
Congress passed the HEAR Act to remedy the effect of the ruling in
Von Saher.207 Although other scholarly articles have questioned the
constitutionality of the HEAR Act,208 Congress was vested with the
constitutional authority to pass legislation in response to the ruling
in Von Saher I. The U.S. Constitution clearly and unambiguously
provides authority to both Congress and the Executive branch for
the enactment of the HEAR Act, and United States Supreme Court
precedent supports this authority.
A. Article I and Article II-Foreign Affairs and War Powers, the
Commerce Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause
Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution vests the
Congress with multiple powers, including regulation of interstate
and foreign commerce, war powers, and “to make any laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing powers….”209 Article II vests in the Executive branch
foreign affairs power to make treaties with foreign nations with the
concurrence of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors to foreign
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010).
See S. Rep. supra note 125.
208 See William L. Charron, The Problem of Purely Procedural Preemption
Presented by the Federal HEAR Act, 2018 Pepp. L. Rev. 19 (2018) (HEAR
preempts state property laws on a purely procedural basis and therefore violates
the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the principles of
federalism); Jason Barnes, Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of
2016: A Federal Reform to State Statutes of Limitations for Art Restitution
Claims, Colum. J. Transnational Law (2018) (HEAR act violates the Tenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); and Herbert L. Lazerow, Holocaust Art
Disputes: The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 51 Int’l Law
195 (2018) (application of HEAR Act would be an unconstitutional taking
under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in cases where state statute
of limitations has expired before enactment of HEAR).
209 U.S. Constit. Art. I, § 8.
206
207
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nations, and to receive foreign heads of state.210 The Constitution
explicitly states that “no State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation [and] no State shall, without the Consent of
Congress…enter into any agreement or Compact with another State,
or with a foreign Power, or engage in War….”211 Thus, Articles I
and II vest in both the Congress and the Executive branch the
exclusive authority over war and foreign affairs powers, and Article
I also vests in Congress the power to regulate interstate and
international commerce.
i. War and Foreign Affairs Powers
The war and foreign affairs powers are the most obvious
Constitutional authority supporting the HEAR Act.212 The Senate
Judiciary Committee noted in its summary report on the HEAR Act
that the “states have been unable to remedy this injustice [of
Holocaust-expropriated art] because the regulation of war-related
disputes is within the powers of the Federal Government.”213 To
support this conclusion, the Senate Judiciary Committee referenced
the Supreme Court’s opinion in American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi where the Court held that foreign policy is the exclusive
purview of the federal government. 214 In Garamendi, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in favor of California,
finding that the state’s Holocaust Victims Insurance Relief Act
“(“HVIRA”) was unconstitutional because it interfered with the
Federal Government’s foreign affairs powers, specifically the
President’s foreign policy powers. 215 Not surprisingly, the Ninth
U.S. Constit. Art. II, § 2 and 3.
U.S. Constit. Art. I, § 10.
212 See U.S. Constit. Art. I, § 8 and Art. II, § 2 and 3.
213 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 5 (2016).
214 See S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 5-6, note 24 (2016) (citing Amer. Insur. Assoc. v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (“Vindicating victims injured by acts and
omissions of enemy corporations in wartime is thus within the traditional
subject matter of foreign policy in which national, not state, interests are
overriding, and which the National Government has addressed.”).
215 See generally Amer. Insur. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
210
211
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Circuit relied heavily upon Garamendi in support of its decision in
Von Saher.216
But, Garamendi is not the only Supreme Court precedent
that supports the Federal Government’s foreign affairs and war
powers. In 1942, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act
which capped rents for housing in “defense rental” areas. 217
Landlords challenged the constitutionality of the Act on several
grounds, including due process and delegation of power to the
Administrator of Office of Price Administration, in the case of
Bowles v. Willingham.218 The Supreme Court held that while
Congress’ war powers were not unlimited,219 Congress was well
within its authority in this instance because it had “done all that due
process under the war emergency requires.”220 The Court frequently
referenced Congress’ war powers throughout its opinion and made
a particularly cogent statement:
We need not determine what constitutional limits there are to pricefixing legislation. Congress was dealing here with conditions
created by activities resulting from a great war effort. A nation
which can demand the lives of its men and women in the waging of
that war is under no constitutional necessity of providing a system
of price control on the domestic front which will assure each
landlord a 'fair return' on his property.221
In the wake of the war, Congress passed the Housing and
Rent Act in 1947 to control rising rents and prevent a housing
shortage due to returning servicemen. 222 The constitutionality of
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010).
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. no. 77-421 (1942).
218 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
219 Id. (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426
(1934), ('even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations
safeguarding essential liberties.')).
220 Id. at 521.
221 Id. at 519 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
222 Housing and Rent Act of 1947, Pub. L. no. 31 (1947).
216
217
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Congress’ action was challenged yet again by a landlord in Woods
v. Cloyd-Miller.223 The Supreme Court held in Woods that Congress
could use its war powers after a war had ended to remedy the effects
of the war.224 The legislative history of the Act revealed that
Congress invoked its war powers to remedy a situation “of which
the war was a direct and immediate cause.”225 The Court relied
heavily on its precedent in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries, where
it previously held “that the war power includes the power to remedy
the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress and continues
for the duration of that emergency.”226 More importantly, the Court
noted in Woods that “the war power does not necessarily end with
the cessation of hostilities.”227 Finally, the Court was careful to point
out that the line of war powers cases follows its precedent in Stewart
v. Kahn, “which held that Congress had the power to toll the statute
of limitations of the States during the period when the process of
their courts was not available to litigants due to the conditions
obtaining in the Civil War.”228
The case of Missouri v. Holland involved a constitutional
challenge to Congress’ power to pass laws to effectuate treaties. 229
The Supreme Court held that the treaty power and the Necessary and
Proper Clause conferred upon Congress the authority to pass
legislation to effectuate a treaty between the United States and Great
Britain to protect migratory birds. 230 According to the Court,
Congress had this authority as long as the treaty was valid and did
not infringe upon the Constitution.231 Justice Holmes noted that
“[n]o doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the
Woods v. Cloyd-Miller, 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
Id.
225 Id. at 144.
226 Id. (citing Hamilton v. KY, 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919)(internal quotations
omitted)).
227 Id. at 141.
228 Id. at 142 (citing Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493 (1870)).
229 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
230 Id.
231 Id.
223
224
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control of the State, but a treaty may override its power.”232 The
Court held that “a national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude…can be protected only by a national action in concert
with that of another power” and “it is not sufficient to rely upon the
States,” reasoning that there may not be any birds left to protect
without Congressional action to uphold the treaty. 233
Upholding the Roosevelt-Litivinov Agreement234 as
supreme over state law, the Supreme Court ruled in U.S. v. Belmont
that the “external powers of the United States are to be exercised
without regard to state laws or policies.” 235 The Court held that this
rule applies not only to treaties requiring concurrence of the Senate
pursuant to Article II, Section 2, but to “all international compacts
and agreements from the very fact that complete power over
international affairs is in the national government, and is not and
cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of
the several states.”236 The case involved a property dispute over
funds transferred to a U.S. bank from a Russian company prior to
the Russian Revolution, which were assigned to the U.S. by the
U.S.S.R. pursuant to the terms of the Roosevelt-Litivinov
Agreement. Belmont’s estate argued that New York state’s property
laws were supreme over the President’s agreement with the U.S.S.R.
because the agreement had not been ratified by the Senate and
therefore was non-binding.237 The Court concluded that because the
Executive branch had constitutional authority to negotiate and enter

Id. at 434. See also Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch 454 (Virginia statute of
limitations on debt collection overridden by peace treaty with U.S. and Great
Britain after Revolutionary War).
233 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
234 The Roosevelt-Litivinov Agreement established diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union, thereby formally recognizing the government of the U.S.S.R. See
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/fdr-ml.htm.
235 See U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
236 Id. at 331.
237 Id.
232
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into these agreements, the agreements were essentially binding
treaties that did not require ratification. 238
Thus, Congress has the constitutional authority to remedy
the effects of war and to pass laws to effectuate U.S. treaties and
agreements entered into by the Executive branch in support of U.S.
foreign policy.
ii. The Commerce Clause
The Constitution also vests Congress with the power “to
regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states….”239 In Wickard v. Filburn, a farmer was penalized pursuant
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 for exceeding the wheat
quota he was allotted under the Act. 240 The farmer argued that the
extra wheat was strictly for his personal use only, so it was never in
the stream of interstate commerce and thus not subject to regulation
by Congress.241 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
Congress can regulate non-commercial intrastate activity, such as
wheat grown for personal consumption, if, in the aggregate, it may
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce as a whole.242
Over a half a century later, the Supreme Court was presented
with a similar claim of home grown marijuana used for personal
medicinal purposes in Gonzales v. Raich.243 While California’s
state law allowed the petitioners to grow and use their own
medicinal marijuana, marijuana possession was illegal under
Id. at 330 (“Government power over external affairs is not distributed, but is
vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what was done
here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that
government.”).
239 U.S. Constit. Art. I, § 8.
240 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
238
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Congress’ Controlled Substances Act. 244 The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the petitioners’ cultivation,
use, and possession of medical marijuana did not substantially affect
interstate commerce and therefore was beyond Congress’ power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause. 245 The Court relied heavily
upon Wickard, noting the strong similarity between the cases and
stating that “Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure
to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana
would leave a gaping hole in the CSA.”246
The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’ Commerce
Clause powers more narrowly in the cases of U.S. v. Morrison and
U.S. v. Lopez.247 In Morrison, the Court held that in order for
Congress to regulate activity under its Commerce Clause power, the
activity must be a preexisting activity that is both interstate and
economic (i.e. commercial) in nature. 248 Lopez narrowed the power
even further by clarifying that Congress must have a rational basis
for any substantial effect it claims an activity or instrumentality may
have on interstate commerce, and instrumentalities must be used for
economic purposes in interstate commerce to fall within Congress’
regulatory powers.249
Thus, Congress has the power to regulate any preexisting
economic instrumentality or activity, including those that are illegal,
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce as long as
Congress has a rational basis to support such regulation.

Id.
Id.
246 Id. at 33.
247 See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding the Violence Against
Women Act was unconstitutional) and U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(holding Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional).
248 See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
249 See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
244
245
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iii. The Necessary and Proper Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause states that Congress has
the authority “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 250 Thus, the
Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to pass laws for
executing its own enumerated powers and the enumerated powers
of another branch of Federal Government.
In Woods, discussed supra, the Supreme Court held that
Congress was well within its constitutional authority to control
rising rents because it had the power to remedy the effects of war
under both the war powers and the Necessary and Proper clause.251
The Court was careful to note that by limiting Congress’ war powers
strictly to wartime, the Necessary and Proper Clause “would be
drastically limited in its application to the several war powers,” and
had previously declined such a narrow interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 252
Therefore, Congress may pass not only laws that are
necessary and proper for executing its own powers, but also to
execute powers vested in the other branches of the U.S.
Government. This would include laws supporting U.S. foreign
policy determined by the Executive branch pursuant to its
Constitutional authority.
B. Article VI-The Supremacy Clause

U.S. Constit. Article I, § 8.
See Woods v. Cloyd-Miller, supra note, at 143.
252 Id.
250
251
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Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, the U.S. Constitution and
“the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land….”253 In Missouri v. Holland, discussed supra, the Supreme
Court held that a valid treaty between the United States and another
sovereign nation was the “supreme law of the land” pursuant to the
language of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, and Congress was
within its constitutional authority to pass a law to effectuate such a
treaty.254
Federal preemption of state law derives from the Supremacy
Clause, which makes federal law the “law of the land.”255 States
cannot adopt laws that are contradictory to federal law. The
Supreme Court has identified three types of preemption: express
preemption, implied field preemption, and implied conflict
preemption.256 With express preemption, Congress expressly states
that it has preempted state law. Implied conflict preemption occurs
when a state law conflicts with federal law, making it impossible to
comply with both laws, or a state law frustrates the objective of the
federal law.257 Implied field preemption occurs when Congress’
regulation of a particular field is so comprehensive that there is no
room for the state to regulate in the same field. 258 In Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Co., Justice Douglas stated that “[t]he scheme of the
federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
U.S. Constit. Art. VI.
See Missouri v. Holland, supra.
255 U.S. Constit. Art. VI.
256 See Von Saher, supra note at 960.
257 Id. at 961. See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (test for
conflict preemption is “whether the [state] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress”); Amer. Insur. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (conflict
preemption occurs only when a federal law intrudes upon a traditional state
responsibility); and Florida Lime Growers and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963) (requiring “actual conflict between the two schemes
of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area”)
258 Id. at 963.
253
254
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inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.
Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” 259 The
Court has held that “the test of preemption is whether the matter on
which the state asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the
federal government.”260
Congress also may preempt certain defenses when it codifies
a statute of limitations. In Petrella v. MGM, the Supreme Court
considered the issue of whether the doctrine of laches barred a
copyright infringement claim that was filed within the three year
statute of limitations under the copyright statute. 261 The dispute in
Petrella centered on a copyright infringement claim for the
screenplay of Martin Scorsese’s film Raging Bull, and the
defendant/respondent studio argued that plaintiff/petitioner’s claim
was barred by laches although her claim was filed timely within the
three-year statute of limitations period set forth in the Copyright
Act.262 The Court found the studio’s reliance on the doctrine of
laches to bar the plaintiff’s claim unpersuasive and held that “in the
face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot
be invoked to bar legal relief.”263 In her opinion for the majority,
Justice Ginsburg noted that “both before and after the merger of law
and equity in 1938, this Court has cautioned against invoking laches
to bar legal relief.”264 Focusing on the distinction between legal and
equitable defenses 265 and the separation of powers, the Court
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Pac. Gas Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation Dev. Comm’n., 461
U.S. 190 (1983) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)
(internal citations omitted).
261 Petrella v. MGM, 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014).
262 Id.
263 Id. at 679.
264 Id. at 678.
265 Id. at 681-682 (“Tolling, which lengthens the time for commencing a civil
action in appropriate circumstances, applies when there is a statute of
limitations; it is, in effect, a rule of interpretation tied to that limit. Laches, in
259
260
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determined that laches was a “gap-filling” measure used by the
judiciary only when Congress had not designated a statute of
limitations.266 Both the majority and the dissent pointed out that the
doctrine of laches applied only in “extraordinary” instances. 267 The
Court cautioned that “[i]nviting individual judges to set a time limit
other than the one Congress prescribed…would tug against the
uniformity Congress sought to achieve when it enacted [the
statute].”268 Most importantly, the Court held that “courts are not at
liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.”269
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s holding in Petrella, the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defense of laches
was codified in the patent statute at issue in SCA Hygiene and
therefore applicable even though the claim had been filed within the
prescribed statutory of limitations period.270 The Supreme Court
disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s analysis in SCA Hygiene,
finding no language that the laches defense was codified in the
statute or applicable to the claim: “Even if we assume for the sake
of argument that [the statute] incorporates a laches defense of some
dimension, it does not necessarily follow that this defense may be
invoked to bar a claim for damages incurred within the period set
out in the [statute].”271 The Court applied its holding in Petrella to
SCA Hygiene and reiterated that “[t]he enactment of a statute of
contrast, originally served as a guide when no statute of limitations controlled
the claim; it can scarcely be described as a rule for interpreting a statutory
prescription.”) (internal citations omitted).
266 Id. at 680 (“We have never applied laches to bar in their entirety claims for
discrete wrongs occurring within a federally prescribed limitations period.”)
267 Id. at 667-8 (“As to equitable relief, in extraordinary circumstances, laches
may bar at the very threshold the particular relief requested by the plaintiff.”).
Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[Laches] applies in those extraordinary cases
where the plaintiff ‘unreasonably delays in filing a suit.’”) (Internal citations
omitted).
268 Id. at 681.
269 Id. at 667.
270 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., 137 S. Ct.
954, 963 (2017).
271 Id.
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limitations necessarily reflects a congressional decision that the
timeliness of covered claims is better judged on the basis of a
generally hard and fast rule rather than the sort of case-specific
judicial determination that occurs when a laches defense is asserted.
Therefore applying laches within a limitations period specified by
Congress would give judges a ‘legislation-overriding role’ that is
beyond the Judiciary’s power.”272 Given that the Court described
its holding in Petrella as “broad,”273 it appears these precedents will
apply to any statute of limitations prescribed by Congress.274
Though federal law is supreme, there are limits to
Congressional power, one of which is that it cannot conflict with the
principles of federalism. Supreme Court precedent is clear that
Congress cannot utilize its constitutional authority to commandeer,
force, or coerce state governments to take action. 275 But, Congress
does have the power to establish a uniform statute of limitations for
a class of cases, especially if those cases are interfering with federal
interests, including international affairs.
C. The Tenth Amendment

Id. at 960 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
274 The question of whether the Court’s holdings in Petrella and SCA Hygiene
apply to the HEAR Act is now before the Supreme Court for consideration on a
petition for writ of certiorari filed by Lauren Zuckerman in Zuckerman v. The
Metropolitan Museum of Art.
275 See, generally, New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that
Congress’ Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of
1985 punished states that did not comply and regulated a state’s regulation of
toxic waste, which amounted to commandeering); Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (holding that Congress cannot commandeer state executive branch
officials to enforce a Federal law (the Brady Bill) by performing background
checks on purchasers of firearms); and Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461
(2018) (holding the PASPA Act unconstitutional because it prohibited states
from legalizing sports gambling, thereby commandeering them).
272
273
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The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people.”276 Traditionally, the regulation of property has been within
the purview of the States and would fall under those powers not
“prohibited” by the Constitution to the States. 277 As discussed
supra, there are exceptions to this rule when it conflicts with the
Federal Government’s exclusive authority to remedy the effects of
war, comply with international treaties and agreements, and regulate
interstate and international commerce, or when a federal law
expressly or impliedly preempts a state law.278
Since the war and foreign affairs powers are vested
exclusively in the Federal Government pursuant to Articles I and II,
the States are prohibited from engaging in the exercise of foreign
affairs or war powers, which require federal control. Even though
the States were independent sovereigns prior to ratification of the
U.S. Constitution, the States relinquished their foreign affairs and
war powers in order to become part of the union. Likewise, the
States are prohibited from regulating interstate and international
commerce because these activities require federal control to
maintain the union.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HEAR ACT
The HEAR Act does not create any cause of action or claim;
it merely extends the statute of limitations period to six years from

U.S. Constit. amend. X.
See Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 964.
278 See generally Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493 (1870) (Congress had power to
toll state statute of limitations due to Civil War); Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch 454
(Virginia statute of limitations on debt collection overridden by peace treaty
with U.S. and Great Britain after Revolutionary War); and Von Saher v. Norton
Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010) (Federal foreign policy
regarding restitution for Holocaust victims of Nazi looted art preempts
California statute of limitations).
276
277
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the time of actual discovery. 279 Therefore, the key operative
provision is Section 5(a), which outlines the uniform statute of
limitations applicable to Holocaust expropriated art.280 Because the
provision arguably interferes with the States’ rights to regulate
property, this provision may be subject to a constitutional
challenge.281 Even if such a challenge makes it to the courts, the Act
ultimately will be upheld as constitutional for the reasons outlined
infra.
A. Congress has the authority to remedy the effects of World War
II, including the restitution of Holocaust expropriated art to its
rightful owners, decades after the war ended.
There is no dispute that the Nazis’ expropriation of art from
Jews and other minorities who did not fit the Aryan ideal was a
direct and immediate cause of World War II. The Nazis engaged in
a systematic plan designed for the sole purpose of stripping Jews
and other minorities of their property, identities, and, ultimately,
their lives in order to fill the coffers of the economically depressed
Nazi state and achieve its goal of Aryanization. The Nazis stole so
much art during their reign of terror that their theft has been
characterized as “the greatest displacement of art in human
history.”282 And, much of that art is still displaced and separated
from its rightful owners almost seventy-five years after the war
HEAR
HEAR
281 See generally William L. Charron, The Problem of Purely Procedural
Preemption Presented by the Federal HEAR Act, 2018 Pepp. L. Rev. 19 (2018)
(HEAR Act preempts state property laws on a purely procedural basis and
therefore violates the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the
principles of federalism); and Jason Barnes, Holocaust Expropriated Art
Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016: A Federal Reform to State Statutes of
Limitations for Art Restitution Claims, Colum. J. Transnational Law (2018)
(HEAR act violates the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
282 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 2 (2016) (quoting Michael J. Bazyler, Holocaust
Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America’s Courts 202 (NYU Press 2003))
(footnote omitted).
279
280
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ended.283 As discussed supra, the rightful owners face many
obstacles in pursuing these claims, including the passage of time,
the lack of documentation and information, and the existence of
legal procedural bars.
The Constitution is clear that war powers are exclusive to the
Federal Government, and Supreme Court precedent confirms that
Congress has the authority to pass laws that are necessary and proper
to facilitate its war powers, including laws to remedy the effects of
war even after the war has ended. Because the Constitution
expressly grants this authority to Congress and the Executive
branch, it prohibits the States from exercising any war powers,
including the power to remedy the effects of war. The Ninth Circuit
held in Von Saher I that California did not have the authority to
remedy the effects of the Holocaust, no matter how noble its
intentions were, because that power is vested exclusively in the
Federal government.284 Therefore, the responsibility for remedying
the effects of the Holocaust, including the restitution of Nazi-looted
art, rests solely in the Federal Government.
If Congress had the constitutional power to toll a State’s
statute of limitations due to the effects of the Civil War, it surely has
the power to extend a State’s statute of limitations to remedy the
horrific consequences of World War II.285 And, according to
Woods, it has the authority to remedy the evils of the Nazi regime,
which were a direct and immediate cause of the war, decades after
the war ended.286 Congress has acted to remedy other effects of
World War II by passing legislation to control rents in certain areas
An estimated 100,000 to 300,000 Nazi-looted artworks are still missing. See
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-one-should-trade-in-or-possessart-stolen-by-the-nazis/2019/01/02/01990232-0ed3-11e9-831f3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html; and
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/can-you-hear-me-now-holocaustexpropriated-art-recovery-hear-act.
284 See Von Saher, supra note
285 See Stewart v. Kahn, supra note
286 See Woods supra note
283
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during the war; to stabilize rents following the return of GIs en
masse at the end of the war; and paying reparations to the Japanese
internment camp survivors over forty years after the war ended.287
Certainly, Congress can rely on the same war powers to create a
nationwide uniform statute of limitations which provides Holocaust
victims with additional time in which to bring claims of Holocaust
expropriated art.
Even though it does not create a claim or cause of action, the
HEAR Act attempts to remedy the effects of the Nazi regime’s
thievery by creating a uniform window of opportunity for victims to
pursue their claims on the merits.288 The HEAR Act deals with a
very unique and disturbing circumstance resulting directly from the
machinations and manipulation of the Nazi regime during World
War II: the systematic expropriation of art, which sadly has
continued to the present day due to governments, museums,
collectors, and others who are willing to ignore the facts and look
the other way when dealing with this art.
A nation which sacrificed many lives of its citizens in a war
to defeat one of the most horrific genocidal and criminal regimes in
the history of the world “is under no constitutional necessity” to
ensure that states’ statutes of limitations continue to provide
unlawful owners of stolen property with the opportunity to utilize
procedural defenses under the guise of equity and states’ rights. 289
Both the States and the unlawful owners in these cases are well
aware of the basic property premise that one cannot get title from a
See Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. no. 77-421 (1942)
(Congressional authorization of rent control in designated areas during World
War II); Housing and Rent Act of 1947 (Congressional authorization of rent
control and preferential treatment in housing sales for returning WWII GIs); and
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. no. 100-383 (1988) (Congressional
authorization of reparations to World War II Japanese internment camp
victims).
288 See HEAR
289 See Bowles, supra, note 218.
287

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2020

55

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1

DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW

56

DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW

VOLUME 30

[Vol. XXX:

thief. And, their constitutional rights are in no way violated by the
creation of a uniform statute of limitations for these claims.
B. Congress has the power to pass legislation to effectuate treaties
and agreements in furtherance of U.S. policy as determined by the
Executive branch.
The Constitution also vests the power of foreign affairs
exclusively in the Executive and Legislative branches. The
Executive branch dictates foreign policy through the State
Department, and the Senate, by a two-thirds concurrence, approves
any treaties the Executive branch may negotiate. Congress has the
power through the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass laws to
effectuate valid agreements and treaties negotiated by the Executive
branch and approved by the Senate.
In 1998, Congress passed (and the President signed) the
Holocaust Victims Redress Act (“HVRA”) to ensure that the U.S.
was fulfilling its obligation for restitution of assets to Holocaust
victims pursuant to the Paris Agreement for Reparations of 1946 and
the 1907 Hague Convention, both binding and valid treaties entered
into by the United States.290 With this legislation, Congress
expressed its sense that all governments should make a good faith
effort to return Nazi-looted art to its rightful owners.291 While the
legislative history and text do not reveal its constitutional authority,
the treaty powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause are the
obvious constitutional authority supporting Congress’ passage of
the HVRA.292
Later that same year, Congress passed (and the President
signed) the U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, which
created the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets

See HVRA supra note
Id.
292 Id.
290
291
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in the United States. 293 Congress authorized this commission to
perform specific duties related to the collection and disposition of
Holocaust victims’ assets, one of which was “to coordinate its
activities with private and governmental entities (including the
international Washington Conference on Holocaust-era Assets).”294
Even though the Washington Conference was not a treaty, Congress
still had constitutional authority to pass this legislation as a
necessary and proper means to execute the power of foreign affairs
vested in the Executive branch’s State Department, which agreed to
the principles set forth in the Washington Conference. 295 The
Supreme Court’s holdings in Missouri v. Holland and U.S. v.
Belmont, both discussed supra, support Congressional action to
effectuate valid treaties and agreements in furtherance of U.S.
foreign policy.296
The legislative history of the HEAR Act does not explicitly
state that Congress relied upon its foreign affairs powers in the
passage of the Act. However, it is obvious from the findings
described therein that Congress relied heavily upon the Federal
Government’s foreign affairs powers in its passage of the Act.297
Even though the Washington Conference Principles and the Terezin
Declaration are agreements, they were agreed to by the State
Department and should be recognized as supreme even though they
do not require ratification in accordance with Article 2, Section 2.
These agreements were entered into pursuant to the foreign powers
authority vested in the Executive branch and do not require
concurrence of the Senate to be the supreme law of the land.298
See US Holocaust Assets Commission Act, Pub. L. no. 105-186, 105th Cong.
(1998).
294 See https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/senate-bill/1900.
295 See U.S. v. Belmont, supra note
296 See Missouri v. Holland and U.S. v. Belmont, supra notes
297 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 5 (2016) (“Yet states have been unable to remedy
this injustice because the regulation of war-related disputes is within the powers
of the Federal Government.”) (footnote omitted).
298 See U.S. v. Belmont supra
293
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In the case of Holocaust expropriated art, it would be
unconstitutional and insufficient to rely upon the States to deal with
an issue of this magnitude involving foreign policy. 299 Most States
will not see these claims in their courts, but those States that do
should not have to waste time and resources, as California did,
revising their statutes if the Federal Government can remedy the
situation using its foreign affairs powers. 300 The HEAR Act
remedies this problem by creating a uniform statute of limitations,
thereby eliminating the choice of law problem that often occurs in
these claims. In doing so, the HEAR Act aligns current U.S. foreign
policy with the principles it agreed to in the Washington Conference
and the Terezin Declaration, assuring that Holocaust expropriated
art claims will be adjudicated on the merits only. 301
C. Nazi-looted art is a commodity in both interstate and
international commerce, and therefore is subject to regulation by
Congress pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers.
Holocaust-expropriated art, like wheat and marijuana, is a
commodity traded in both interstate and international commerce;
thus it is subject to federal regulation pursuant to the Constitution.302
Similar to the market for marijuana, there is also a black market for
art.303 Holocaust expropriated art is sometimes in the stream of
See U.S. v. Belmont, supra
Subsequent to the ruling in Von Saher, California revised its statute to
include all claims for stolen art work, not just Holocaust-expropriated art. The
statute was later upheld as constitutional. See S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 5, note 26
(2016).
301 The HEAR Act also dovetails with previous executive policy dating back to
World War II, including the Monuments Men, Military Government Law 59,
the London Declaration, FBI seizures in the 1950s, and government seizures
increasing in frequency since Portrait of Wally was seized.
302 U.S. Constit., Art. II, § 8.
303 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding, inter alia, that Congress
has the power to regulate commerce in both legal and illegal markets); Von
Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“Tracking the provenance of Nazi-looted art is nearly impossible, since many
299
300
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commerce at the time a claim is made by a Holocaust victim or her
heir, but oftentimes it is in the possession of private collectors,
museums, and the like. Whether artwork is on the auction block or
held in a collection, it is still a commodity in interstate and
international commerce, and often of tremendous financial value.
If the Nazi-looted art at issue in these cases is kept out of the
stream of commerce, demand and prices increase astronomically as
each year passes.304 As a result, unlawful owners may gain an
inflated sense of entitlement to the art due to its increased monetary
and cultural value stemming from the natural ebb and flow of supply
and demand. In turn, unlawful owners may be increasingly
unwilling to return the art to its rightful owner, particularly if its
value has skyrocketed over the years. Rightful owners of Holocaust
expropriated art are often prevented from discovering and
recovering their property, which is why the Federal Government
enacted the HEAR Act to comply with federal foreign policy on the
restitution of Holocaust expropriated art. 305 Therefore, Congress
has the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate Nazilooted art through the HEAR Act, even if such art is not produced
for sale and is utilized merely for personal reasons because, if taken
in the aggregate, such art has a substantial effect on both the legal
and illegal interstate art market and the international art market.

changes of ownership went undocumented, and most of the transactions took
place on the black market.”) (internal citation omitted); and Guggenheim v.
Lubbell, 77 N.Y.2d. 311, 314, 320 (N.Y. 1991) (illicit market for stolen art is
“an industry all its own” and placing burden on true owner to locate stolen art
encourages illicit trade).
304 See also Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery
Act of 2016: An Ineffective Remedy for Returning Nazi-Looted Art, U. Ill. Rev.
363, 380 (2019).
305 See also Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery
Act of 2016: An Ineffective Remedy for Returning Nazi-Looted Art, U. Ill. Rev.
363, 379-382 (2019).
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D. The Federal Government has the power to preempt state
statute of limitations laws due to the unique and horrific
circumstances of World War II and the Holocaust.
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, the Federal Government
has the authority to preempt state statute of limitations laws due to
the unique and horrific circumstances of World War II in an effort
to make the process for pursuing claims of Holocaust expropriated
art more just. In Von Saher I, the Ninth Circuit conducted a field
preemption analysis on California’s statute extending the statute of
limitations for Holocaust expropriated art claims and determined
that the statute was an unconstitutional assumption of the Federal
Government’s foreign affairs powers to remedy the effects of World
War II.306 The Ninth Circuit held that restitution of Nazi-looted art
was within the exclusive purview of the Federal Government under
its foreign affairs powers, and there was no room for the state of
California to regulate in this area. 307 Presumably taking no issue
with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court denied Von
Saher’s petition for certiorari in June of 2011.308
See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.
2010).
307 Id.
308 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). Shortly
after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, California amended its statute to extend its
statute of limitations on stolen art from three to six years and to require actual
discovery of the artwork and its location before the statute began to run. See
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 754 F.3d 712, 718-719 (9th Cir.
2014). After the statute was amended, von Saher filed a first amended
complaint, which was dismissed by the District Court upon the Museum’s
motion to dismiss. Id. at 719. The District Court agreed with the Museum’s
argument that Von Saher’s “specific claims and the remedies she
sought…conflicted with the United States’ express federal policy on recovered
art.” Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Von Saher’s claims “[did] not
conflict with any federal policy because the Cranachs were never subject to
postwar internal restitution proceedings in the Netherlands, as noted in the
complaint, the district court's order and the opinion of the Court of Appeals of
The Hague.” Id. at 721. The Museum’s petition for certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court in January 2015. When the District Court granted the
Museum’s motion for summary judgment, Von Saher appealed to the Ninth
306

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol30/iss1/1

60

Kreder and Schell: The Constitutionality of the HEAR Act: Empowering American Courts to Return Holocaust-Era Artwork and Honor History

KREDER AND SCHELL: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HEAR ACT: EMPOWERING AMERICAN COURTS TO RETURN
HOLOCAUST-ERA ARTWORK AND HONOR HISTORY

2020]

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HEAR ACT

61

Under a field preemption analysis, the HEAR Act is
constitutional because the Federal Government has impliedly
regulated the area of Holocaust expropriated art through its
constitutional foreign affairs and war powers, leaving no room for
the States to take action. Leaving the issue to the States to resolve
has resulted in many cases being unjustly decided on purely
procedural defenses instead of on the merits of the claims. Thus, the
HEAR Act preempts the states’ regulation of property in this very
narrow field of Holocaust expropriated art in order to remedy this
unfortunate result and allow the courts to hear these claims on the
merits.309
Circuit for a third time. See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 897
F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2018). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant
of summary judgment, finding that the act of state doctrine applied but no
exceptions to the act of state doctrine applied. Id. The Supreme Court denied
von Saher’s second petition for certiorari in 2018.
The Ninth Circuit is known for being the most overturned U.S. Court of
Appeals by the United States Supreme Court. Given this fact along with the
makeup of the Court, there was a high likelihood that the Supreme Court would
have accepted Von Saher’s petitions had they thought the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis was wrong either in 2011 or 2018. Of note, the Supreme Court
accepted a petition for certiorari on the issue of state sovereignty submitted in
the same term as Von Saher’s second petition for certiorari (the third petition for
certiorari in the case). See generally Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 587 U.S.
___ (2019) (holding that a state cannot be sued in another state’s courts). It
seems likely the Court would have accepted Von Saher’s first petition in 2011 if
the Justices thought the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was incorrect because Von
Saher’s first petition focused on the issues of states’ rights and federal
preemption.
309 This is exactly what Justice Handler suggested in his dissent in O’Keeffe:
“The better approach, I would suggest, is one that enables the parties to get to
the merits of the controversy. It would recognize an artist's or owner's right to
assert a claim against a newly-revealed receiver or possessor of stolen art as
well as the correlative right of such a possessor to assert all equitable and legal
defenses. This would enable the parties to concentrate directly upon entitlement
to the artwork rather than entitlement to bring a lawsuit. By dealing with the
merits of the claims instead of the right to sue, such an approach would be more
conducive to reconciling the demands for individual justice with societal needs
to discourage art thievery. In addition, such a rule would comport more closely
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The outcome would be the same under a conflict preemption
analysis. Any state statutes that provide a claimant of Holocaust
expropriated art with a statute of limitations that is less than six years
from the date of actual discovery would be in direct conflict with the
HEAR Act. This would include any state statutes that apply
constructive and imputed knowledge to the heirs of Holocaust
victims, which does not comport with the actual knowledge
requirement of the HEAR Act. These types of statutes would
directly conflict with the second purpose of the HEAR Act, which
is “to ensure that claims are not unfairly barred by statutes of
limitations and are resolved in a just and fair manner” and would
frustrate Congress’ objective in effectuating U.S. foreign policy. 310
Thus, the HEAR Act would preempt these types of state statutes
because they frustrate the objectives of Congress in its enactment of
the HEAR Act. Alternatively, in most cases, it would be impossible
to comply with both the state and federal statute. A shorter state
statute of limitation would bar the claim, although it may not be
time-barred under the HEAR Act. And a state that allows for
constructive and imputed knowledge would conflict with the HEAR
Act’s definitions of actual discovery and knowledge. Thus, the
HEAR Act would preempt a state statute under these scenarios as
well.
Another form of preemption may occur when Congress has
prescribed a statute of limitations, thereby barring the use of
equitable defenses like laches. According to the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Petrella and SCA Hygiene, a laches defense is
preempted when Congress prescribes a statute of limitations because
a court cannot override the legislative authority of Congress, and
with traditional common law values emphasizing the paramountcy of the rights
of a true owner of chattels as against others whose possession is derived from
theft. Simultaneously, it would acknowledge that the claims of the true owner as
against subsequent converters may in appropriate circumstances be
counterbalanced by equitable considerations.” O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478,
508 (N.J. 1980) (Handler, J. dissenting).
310 HEAR Act
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equitable defenses are not applicable in the context of a statutorily
defined statute of limitations.311 Like the copyright and patent
statutes at issue in those cases, the HEAR Act codifies a prescribed
statute of limitations for Holocaust expropriated art claims and is
silent on whether equitable defenses such as laches may be used to
bar claims brought under the statute of limitations. 312 Despite the
issue of Congressional intent in removing the bar on the laches
defense in the HEAR Act, SCA Hygiene confirms that laches still is
not an available defense even if the statute contains express or
implied language allowing its use.313 Under the precedents of
Petrella and SCA Hygiene, the HEAR Act may preempt the use of
the laches doctrine in defense of Holocaust expropriated art
claims.314
When federal and state courts uphold the use of the laches
doctrine in claims filed under the HEAR Act, they are overriding
Congressional authority expressly prohibited by Petrella.315 Such
See Petrella, supra note; See SCA Hygiene, supra note
As discussed in Section II, an early version of the Senate bill specifically
precluded equitable defenses and laches, but this language was removed by the
Senate in an amendment with no explanation as to why it was removed. See S.
Rep. No. 114-394, at 7 (2016). Herbert Lazerow interprets the language of the
HEAR Act to mean that equitable defenses, including laches, are still available
because the statute only mentions “defenses at law.” Herbert L. Lazerow,
Holocaust Art Disputes: The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016,
51 Int’l Law 195 (2018). Frankel and Sharoni, however, rely upon statutory
construction principles and argue that if language is removed from the bill, then
it “may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.” Frankel & Sharoni,
Navigating the HEAR Act of 2016, 42 Colum. J.L. & Arts 157 (2019). The
Second Circuit relied heavily upon Frankel and Sharoni’s article in its opinion
affirming that the laches defense applied in Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan
Museum of Art. See Zuckerman, 928 F.3d 186 (2d. Cir. 2019). Justice Breyer
noted in his dissent in Petrella that “silence [in a statute] is consistent, not
inconsistent, with the application of equitable doctrines.” Petrella at 694.
313 See SCA Hygiene, supra note
314 Petrella and SCA Hygiene involved copyright and patent statutes which are
under the jurisdiction of the federal courts, unlike the state statute of limitations
that are preempted by the HEAR Act.
315 See Petrella, supra note
311
312
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judicial override defeats the intent of Congress to create a uniform
statute of limitations for these claims and to align U.S. law with its
existing foreign policy on Holocaust expropriated art.316 Further,
allowing individual judges to determine whether laches applies in
these cases has resulted in the uneven application of the HEAR Act.
As the cases of Reif and Zuckerman clearly demonstrate, the case by
case determination of whether laches applies results in divergent
outcomes—some claimants’ cases are heard on the merits while
others are dismissed before the merits are reached. In fact, the
Second Circuit recognized that divergent outcomes would occur
when it affirmed the laches defense in Zuckerman: “[W]hile the
laches defense succeeds here, in other cases it will fail and not
impede recovery for claims brought pursuant to the HEAR Act.”317
Allowing judges to dismiss these cases due to laches heavily
disadvantages the claimants by depriving them of the opportunity to
have their claims heard on the merits, which is the overarching
purpose of the HEAR Act.318 If state and federal courts continue to
dismiss these claims based on laches, then the HEAR Act is, for the
most part, nullified by judicial override. As Justice Ginsberg
indicated in Petrella, plaintiffs must “sue now or forever hold your
peace” when laches are allowed in the face of a Congressionally
designated statute of a limitations.319 Congress was trying to avoid
this very scenario when it enacted the HEAR Act because claimants
were losing their right to sue due to discrepancies in statute of
limitations and the discovery rule among the states.320 Thus, the
See Petrella, supra note at 680-681.
Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 197 (2d Cir.
2019).
318 HEAR
319 See Petrella, supra note at 682.
320 “The HEAR Act thus serves two purposes: first, to ensure that laws
governing claims to Nazi-confiscated art and other property further United
States policy as set forth in the Washington Conference Principles on NaziConfiscated Art, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the Terezin
Declaration; and, second, to ensure that claims to artwork and other property
stolen or misappropriated by the Nazis are not unfairly barred by statutes of
limitations but are resolved in a just and fair manner.” S. Rep. No. 114-394, at
6 (2016).
316
317
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only way to avoid the separation of powers problem inherent in the
judicial override of the HEAR Act and to fulfill the intent of
Congress to align U.S. law with its long-standing foreign policy and
to ensure these claims are heard on the merits is preemption of the
laches defense by the statute of limitations set forth in the HEAR
Act.321
Congress, pursuant to its constitutionally enumerated
powers, has impliedly occupied the entire field of Holocaust
expropriated art by creating a uniform statute of limitations and
strictly defining actual discovery, thereby leaving no room for the
States to regulate in this very narrow and specific area.
Additionally, most state statutes of limitations, with the exception
of New York, would directly conflict with and frustrate the
objectives of Congress in its enactment of the HEAR Act. Further,
certain equitable defenses may be preempted when Congress
prescribes a statute of limitations, as it has in the HEAR Act.
Therefore, the HEAR Act must preempt any state statute of
limitations and the use of the laches defense.
Finally, Congress has not commandeered the States in the
HEAR Act. There is no language in the statute that directs the States
to take any action.322 In fact, the language of the operative provision
Section 5 (a) is permissive. 323 The only mandatory language used in
the statute pertains to “possible misidentification” under Section
5(b) and the limitations of the Act outlined in subsections (c)
through (f).324 There is no evidence that Congress has attempted to
The preemption issue will be decided by the Supreme Court if it accepts
Zuckerman’s petition for writ of certiorari in Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan
Museum of Art. See note , supra.
322 See HEAR Act.
323 See Id. (“[A] civil claim or cause of action against a defendant to recover any
artwork or other property that was lost during the covered period because of
Nazi persecution may be commenced not later than 6 years….”) (emphasis
added).
324 See Id.
321
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commandeer the States or their courts by extending the statute of
limitations for these very unique and limited claims. And, there is
no evidence that the States have objected to the uniform statute of
limitations and definition of actual discovery set forth in the HEAR
Act.
Nor does the HEAR Act command state courts to hear cases
they otherwise would not, i.e. claims of title by adverse
possession.325 Because all states except New Jersey 326 follow the
common law discussed supra, there was no need for Congress to
pass a new federal conversion statute to cover such claims. Simply
put, one cannot get title from a thief.327 Therefore, no state courts
Herbert Lazerow posits that if a current possessor has acquired a Holocaust
expropriated artwork by adverse possession upon expiration of a state statute
prior to the enactment of HEAR, then the HEAR Act violates the Takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by extending the state
statute of limitations to allow the rightful owner to take action against the
adverse possessor. Herbert L. Lazerow, Holocaust Art Disputes: The Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 51 Int’l Law 195 (2018) at 28. But, the
law is clear that one cannot get legal title from a thief even through adverse
possession. See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d. Cir. 2010). Only in New
Jersey may a thief or subsequent good-faith purchaser acquire legal title to
stolen artwork through adverse possession upon expiration of the statute of
limitations. See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478 (N.J. 1980). While Lazerow’s
theory is beyond the scope of this article, Justice Handler identified the inherent
problem with granting legal title by adverse possession in his dissent in
O’Keeffe: “[T]he majority's view, derived from an affidavit, that stability of
possession and title is as important in the world of art as it is in the field of
commercial sales and, indeed, is so important that it requires a rule that will,
more often than not, settle title to stolen art in the hands of an ultimate possessor
whether he or she be truly innocent, simply lucky, just plain cunning, or actually
larcenous….No persuasive reasons are advanced for the view that this notion of
"stability," which would serve in many cases actually to legitimatize art theft, is
more important than is the return of stolen unique, artistic creations to their
creator or true owner when this is justified by equitable considerations.” Id. at
512. (Handler, J. dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
326 See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478 (N.J. 1980).
327 Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 149 (2d. Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., concurring)
(“Under American law and the law of many foreign states there is only one
scenario in which a good faith purchaser’s claim of title is immediately
325
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other than those in New Jersey would have considered claims to title
by adverse possession upon expiration of the statute of limitations
prior to, or after, the HEAR Act.
E. The Constitution expressly prohibits the States from engaging
in foreign affairs.
The Tenth Amendment expressly prohibits the States from
engaging in matters of foreign affairs because those powers are
vested exclusively in the Federal Government pursuant to Articles I
and II of the Constitution. 328 Foreign policy is a function that was
rescinded from the States and vested fully in the Federal
Government when the States joined the union upon ratification of
the Constitution.329 As Congress expressed in its findings, the
HEAR Act is intended to effectuate U.S. foreign policy with regard
to the principles and goals of the Washington Conference and the
Terezin Declaration to ensure that Holocaust expropriated art claims
are adjudicated on the merits only.330 By creating a uniform statute
of limitations that preempts the States’ statute of limitations,
Congress is ensuring that all adjudications of these very special
claims align with the goals of U.S. foreign policy in restitution of
Holocaust expropriated art.
In sum, Congress and the Executive Branch were acting well
within the authority of their constitutionally enumerated powers in
the enactment of the HEAR Act.

recognized over that of the original owner. This scenario arises when the owner
voluntarily parts with possession by the creation of a bailment, the bailee
converts the chattel, and the nature of the bailment allows a reasonable buyer to
conclude that the bailee is empowered to pass the owner’s title.”).
328 See U.S. Constit., supra note
329 See U.S. Const. art. I, IV, and VI and U.S. Const. amend. X and XI.
330 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 6 (2016).
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V. CONCLUSION
The HEAR Act is constitutional and does not violate the
principles of federalism. States do not have the authority to remedy
the effects of war, enter into treaties or agreements with foreign
nations, or regulate interstate and international commerce. While
property regulation is traditionally within the purview of the States,
there is a wide variance of time periods and knowledge requirements
in the state statutes of limitations, making it difficult for the United
States to comply with the Washington Conference and the Terezin
Declaration that Holocaust expropriated art claims be adjudicated
on the merits. By creating a federal uniform statute of limitations
for Holocaust-expropriated art claims and defining actual discovery
and knowledge, the HEAR Act empowers both state and federal
courts to hear these claims on the merits and not dismiss them on
procedural defenses. It returns the focus to a more just imperative
where the lost heritage of those who were persecuted by the Nazi
regime may be restored. The HEAR Act provides Holocaust victims
and their heirs with a more expansive window of opportunity to have
their stories heard in American courts, instead of rejected under the
guise of equity and procedural defenses that unfairly operate in favor
of the unlawful owners.
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